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 This thesis analyzes Japan’s decision to use Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
(DSMs) in trade agreements. International trade rules are effective when properly 
applied: they prevent abrogation of the obligations that come with membership in 
international economic organizations. The DSMs are important ways to enforce the 
international trade commitments agreed upon by signatory countries. To date, member 
countries have filed more than 500 cases through the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
effectively enforcing the rules of the largest multilateral trade organization. On the other 
hand, in Japan's regional trade agreements (RTAs), none of the DSMs have ever been 
invoked despite the presence of many potential disputes. This paper first looks through 
the previous literature related to the use/non-use of DSMs. After that it introduces 
originally collected data on Japan’s DSMs in trade agreements and analyzes which 
variables affect Japan’s decision to initiate a formal dispute settlement process in the 
World Trade Organization. It finds that the amount of export, the degree of democracy, 
and sectoral characteristics positively affect Japan’s decision of using a DSM. On the 
other hand, Japan’s decision to use or join a DSM is negatively affected by RTA with a 
disputing country, Southeast Asian category, the number of use times when Japan used 
 DSMs with that disputing country, and even the disputing country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita. The results of analysis implies that the Japan is concerned that 
using a DSM may worsen the relations with a disputing country. I suggest multilateral 
DSM would be a better option to mitigate Japan’s concerns about using a DSM in its 
RTAs.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Both international trade and the legal institutionalization of trade have 
increased in the past decades. With the creation of the WTO in 1995, and rapid increase 
in RTAs, trade has been institutionalized and legalized to an extent never seen before.1 
One of the strongest indicators of increased legalization are formalized dispute 
settlement mechanisms (DSMs), wherein trade disputes can be settled through 
third-party, neutral arbiters. If the obligations of trade agreements cannot be enforced 
when one of signatories to a trade agreement fails to comply with the obligations, the 
practical value of the commitment of trade agreements decreases. Concurrent with the 
creation of the WTO, RTAs also began to develop highly formalized DSMs.2 Settling 
disputes in a timely and structured manner helps to prevent the detrimental effects of 
unresolved international trade conflicts and to mitigate the imbalances between 
stronger and weaker players; disputes are settled on the basis of rules rather than 
allowing political power to determine the outcome.  
                                                   
1 Hillman, J. (2009). Conflicts between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements and the 
WTO-What Should WTO Do. Cornell Int'l LJ, 42, 193; Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2013). The expansion of 
preferential trading arrangements. International Studies Quarterly, 57(3), 592-604; Rosendorff, B. P. (2005). Stability 
and rigidity: politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. American Political Science Review, 99(03), 
389-400; Goldstein, J., & Martin, L. L. (2000). Legalization, trade liberalization, and domestic politics: a cautionary note. 
International organization, 54(03), 603-632. 
2 Froese, M. D. (2014). Regional Trade Agreements and the Paradox of Dispute Settlement. Manchester Journal of 
International Economic Law, 11(3), 367-396.   
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 In the WTO, as of April 1, 2016, more than 500 cases have been filed.3 However, 
the use of most RTA DSMs is very limited.4 As RTAs give signatory states more preferable 
trade terms than larger international organizations such as the WTO, the limited use of 
RTA DSMs is startling: states are not taking full advantage of the beneficial trade 
agreements that they invested considerable resources in negotiating. Limited use of the 
RTA DSMs implies a systematic reason why RTA DSMs are not the preferred method to 
resolve the conflicts that inevitably rise within international trade.5 Japan, in fact, has 
not used any RTA DSM to resolve a dispute, despite the presence of many potential 
cases. This paper seeks to understand this puzzling non-use of the established 
institutional mechanisms, asking: Why is the use of the DSM different between the WTO 
and the RTA? What factors affect the state’s decision to use the DSM?   
Is Legalization Effective? 
 In order to resolve interstate disputes peacefully, efficacy of legalization of 
international system is important. Legally effective DSM removes the uncertainty of 
enforcement of international trade agreements. International trade rules can be 
effective when they are properly applied, and the highly legalized and institutionalized 
DSMs are important ways to enforce obligations committed in the international trade 
                                                   
3 WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases. Available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.  
4 Chase, C., Yanovich, A., Crawford, J. A., & Ugaz, P. (2013). Mapping of Dispute Settlement  Mechanisms in 
Regional Trade Agreements-Innovative or Variations on a Theme?; Jung, Y. S. (2013). Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
and Power Asymmetry in Regional Trade Agreements. Available at SSRN 2346569.  
5 One may assume there may be no conflicts or disputes in RTAs. However, as is outlined in great detail in Chapter 4, 
there are numerous examples of conflicts within RTAs.  
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rules among signatory countries.6 Jo and Namgung mention RTA DSMs “have been 
shown to significantly influence the functioning RTAs and are associated with pacifying 
and trade-enhancing effects.”7 According to Yarbrough and Yarbrough, in the absence of 
an international authority with powers to impose sanction for non-compliance, if an 
agreement can automatically impose substantial costs on any party guilty of 
noncompliance, the agreement may be feasible.8 A system which allows a third party to 
judge and punish noncompliance provides an automatic enforcement mechanism. By 
explicitly embodying a credible threat of retaliation or reciprocal action, trade 
agreements become self-enforcing.  
 DSMs are set up in most trade agreements to ensure the agreements can be 
enforced and disputes can be settled.9 The WTO indicates on its website that effective 
DSMs are important to enforce obligations and commitments undertaken in trade 
agreements.10 The European Commission (EC) illustrates the importance of DSMs: 
“DSMs provide a rapid and effective means of settling disagreements on whether a 
country has acted in conformity with its international obligations. DSMs apply the 
agreements, and develop the interpretative understanding of the agreements. By 
                                                   
6 European Commission (“EC”), Dispute Settlement. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/dispute-settlement/.  
7 Jo, H., & Namgung, H. (2012). Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Preferential Trade Agreements Democracy, 
Boilerplates, and the Multilateral Trade Regime. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(6), 1041-1068. P.1042; Kono, D. Y. 
(2007). Making anarchy work: International legal institutions and trade cooperation. Journal of Politics, 69(3), 
746-759.  
8 Yarbrough, B. V., & Yarbrough, R. M. (1986). Reciprocity, bilateralism, and economic ‘hostages’: Self-enforcing 
agreements in international trade. International Studies Quarterly, 30(1), 7-21. 
9 EC, supra note 6. 
10 WTO, Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system. Available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s1p1_e.htm.  
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preventing retaliation before a dispute settlement procedure has been completed, trade 
damaging unilateral action is avoided.”11  
 Nevertheless, some debate does exist about the effectives of DSMs in trade 
agreements. According to Rosendorff, while many scholars have viewed the introduction 
of the WTO DSM as highly successful and effective, others disagree.12 Some say the 
frequent use of the WTO DSM may be due to increased violations of treaty obligations, 
rather than an indicator of institutional effectiveness. Lewis and Bossche,13 and 
Kalderimis14 call the WTO DSM “the jewel of crown,” referring to the institution as a 
pinnacle of international legalization.  
The WTO DSM is particularly an improvement over the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) DSM. The creation of the Appellate Body, adoption of the 
reverse consensus rule regarding the adopting the report of a panel and the Appellate 
Body, and creation of a procedure by which a Member may suspend concessions against 
the unsuccessful party are on improvements in the WTO DSM from the GATT DSM. The 
legalized WTO DSM has worked better than the GATT DSM.15 For example, the WTO 
DSM ended the de facto veto right of defendants in the GATT DSM.16 
                                                   
11 EC, supra note 6. 
12 Rosendorff, B. P. (2005), supra note 1.  
13 Lewis, M. and Bossche, P. (2013). What to do when disagreement strikes? : The Complexity of Dispute Settlement 
under Trade Agreements. Trade Agreements at the Crossroads, 9-25.  
14 Kaldermis. K, (2013).Exploring the differences between WTO and investment treaty dispute resolution. Trade 
Agreements at the Crossroads, 46-65.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Davis, C. L. (2012). Why adjudicate?: enforcing trade rules in the WTO. Princeton University Press.  
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 Davey also finds the WTO DSM has generally provided an effective mechanism 
through which WTO Members are able to resolve disputes since 1995.17 Davis also 
mentions the WTO DSM is quite effective in resolving disputes and shows the WTO DSM 
increases the probability of progress to resolve the complaint by one-third and is 
correlated with a reduction in the time to removal of the barrier.18 Iida analyzes the 
effectiveness of the WTO DSM with regard to several dimensions.19 According to Iida, in 
the 1980s, the United States in particular turned increasingly to unilateral measures 
authorized under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 as a solution of international 
trade disputes. Iida found the WTO DSM has been most effective in disarming the U.S. 
Section 301 compared to the GATT DSM because the U.S. has rarely unilaterally resorted 
to Section 301 since the auto talks debates in the WTO DSM in 1995. Iida mentions the 
WTO DSM was constructed to fend off unilateralism. Iida also analyzed whether disputes 
in the WTO DSM have reached mutually agreeable solutions or if the decisions of the 
WTO DSM are implemented. Iida found the scorecard of the WTO DSM is good only in 
the first few years between 1995 and 2003, or that the ratio of “resolved” cases were 
high only before 1998. Since 1998, the stockpile of pending cases has been increasing in 
Iida.20 As of March 1, 2016, a reexamination of Iida’s analysis using WTO case data finds 
that among 503 cases, 48.5% cases are “resolved”, 1.8% cases are “ongoing”, “pending” 
                                                   
17 Davey, W. J. (2005). The WTO dispute settlement system: the first ten years. Journal of International Economic Law, 
8(1), 17-50.  
18 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
19 Iida, K. (2004). Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective?. Global Governance, 10(2), 207-225.  
20 Ibid.  
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cases are 29.6%, “not known” cases are 19.1% and “failed to resolve” cases are 1.0%.21 
Figure 1 presents the results and progress of the WTO cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Results and Progress of Cases in the WTO DSMs22 
 It is easy to interpret the “resolved” and “failed to resolve” but it is difficult to 
evaluate “ongoing”, “pending” and “not known” because some cases in these categories 
may be resolved in the future and some may not but no one cannot know the future 
result. When comparing only “resolved” cases and “failed to resolve” cases, the WTO 
DSM seems to work well.  
 In the case of the WTO DSM, procedures begin with a complaint stating the 
legal basis for the complaint by one or more countries against another, followed by 
consultation between the countries, a WTO panel report on the issue, and potentially 
                                                   
21 WTO, Current status of disputes. Available: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm.  
22 WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases, supra note 3. 
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trade sanctions against one of the countries.23 On the other hand, contents of RTA 
DSMs vary across agreements.24 For example, some RTAs have provisions of establishing 
standing tribunals or courts, whereas others use ad hoc tribunals for resolving disputes. 
Allee and Elsig mention how hundreds of international agreements with DSMs include 
various features associated with timely resolutions, selection of panelists, forum choice, 
and sanctions.25  
 Given the general efficacy of the WTO DSM, states have been quick to imitate 
the institutional design when negotiating bilateral or regional trade agreements. 
According to Froese, there are three reasons why states which are heavily involved in the 
WTO DSM may wish to develop similar mechanisms in RTAs. First, DSMs are a statement 
of confidence in the RTA. Second, DSMs are a straightforward attempt to protect 
WTO-extra and WTO-plus agreements. Third, DSMs are an expression of confidence in 
an approach to dispute settlement that privileges judicial independence.26  
Not all RTAs adopt the same institutional structures as the WTO. The process of 
RTA DSM can range from diplomatic, power-based forms of resolution, to more judicial, 
rules based procedures.27 For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA) DSM includes diplomatic elements and therefore does 
                                                   
23 Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth Edition; Davis, C. L. (2012).  
24 Chase et al, supra note 4.  
25 Allee, T., & Elsig, M. (2014). Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? 
New evidence from preferential trade agreements. The Review of International Organizations, 1-32.  
26 Froese, M. D. (2014), supra note 2. 
27 Lewis, M. and Bossche, P. (2013), supra note 13.  
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not function as a neutral and professional arbitration mechanism as well as the WTO.28 
Some RTAs such as, the India-Nepal Free Trade Agreement (FTA), adopt political 
consultations to reduce trade tensions instead of adopting third party adjudication while 
others like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have done so.29 RTA 
DSMs without a third party adjudication system are susceptible to trade disputes being 
decided by political power rather than more neutral trade rules.  
 There are other alternative explanations for differences in institutional design. Li 
found countries belonging to the same RTA tend to have fewer trade conflicts between 
themselves.30 Chase et al explain that even after signing an RTA, member states 
continue to use not the RTA DSMs but the WTO DSM to resolve disputes.31 Davey 
mentions that, for the most part, the formal procedures of RTA DSMs are not used much 
except in NAFTA and Mercosur and the WTO DSM seems to be more legitimate and 
effective.32 Jung says the relative disuse of a RTA DSM results from the superiority of the 
WTO DSM in minimizing inequality across with power asymmetry.33 According to Busch, 
a liberal country prefers to use the WTO DSM from the point of forum shopping 
                                                   
28 Puig, G. V., & Tat, L. T. (2015). Problems with the ASEAN Free Trade Area Dispute Settlement Mechanism and 
Solutions for the ASEAN Economic Community. Journal of World Trade, 49(2), 277-308. 
29 Jo, H., & Namgung, H. (2012), supra note 7.  
30 Li, T. (2014). What Affect Trade Disputes?. 
31 Chase et al, supra note 4.  
WTO Secretariat, "World Trade Report 2011 – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to 
Coherence" (WTO, 2011). 
32 Davey, W. (2006). Dispute settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A comment. Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO 
Legal System, 343-57.  
33 Jung, Y. S. (2013), supra note 4.  
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considering a merit of making a case law.34 Many scholars found countries prefer using 
the WTO DSM to using RTA DSMs. RTA DSMs seem to be inferior to the WTO DSM in 
institutional design.  
 The potential use of a DSM may work to solve a dispute in the negotiation 
stages. Once the DSM procedures start, it can be very costly for respondent countries to 
effectively litigate the case. As a result, respondent countries might want to avoid going 
to the DSM stage and subsequently may cease to violate the rules, making the DSM an 
effective deterrent. However, considering the important roles of the RTA DSMs to 
enforce obligations, the limited use of the RTA DSMs indicates current RTAs may allow 
countries to derogate from trade rules limiting the deterrence effect. Given the 
proliferation of RTAs, and continued regionalization of the international economy, the 
lack of formal legalization within RTAs is a serious challenge to the international trade 
system supported by RTA proliferation. 
Japan’s Problems of RTA DSMs 
The number of RTAs are increasing around the world. As of February 1, 2016, 
625 notifications of RTAs had been received by the GATT/WTO.35 As of March 1, 2016, 
fourteen Japanese RTAs have been implemented.36 Despite the increase in RTAs, the 
                                                   
34 Busch, M. L. (2007). Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute settlement in international trade. 
International Organization, 61(04), 735-761.  
35 WTO, Regional trade agreements. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.  
36 METI, EPA/FTA/Toshi kyotei (EPA/FTA/Investment Treaties). Available: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/index.html. The rules and procedures of Japanese RTA DSMs are in 
Appendix A. 
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usage of DSMs in trade agreements has not proportionally increased.37 In particular for 
Japan, the country has not formally participated in a RTA dispute settlement procedure 
despite the existence of multiple potential disputes of Japan’s RTAs, which are outlined 
in the reports of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI)38 and 
Japan Machinery Center for Trade and Investment (JMC).39  
 Japan has faced an Indonesian violation of Japan-Indonesia Economic 
Partnership Agreement (JIEPA) regarding the overcharge of import tariffs on Japanese 
automobiles since 2014. According to the Japanese news, it seems that Indonesia tries 
to protect local companies that collaborate with foreign companies.40 Japan has held 
multiple Minsterial-level meetings with Indonesia to resolve this problem, but it has not 
yet been settled.41 Japan has the option to use the JIEPA’s DSM but has not exercised 
that right and does not appear to be poised to do so in the future.  
 The JIEPA was signed in August 20, 2007 and came into effect in 1 July, 2008. 
Indonesia reviewed the import tariff rate for certain automobiles imported from Japan 
based on the JIEPA in 2012, but Japanese auto makers found the issues with the tariff 
rate and informed the Japanese government in January 2013. As Table 1.1 shows, there 
                                                   
37 Chase et al, supra note 4.  
38 METI, Report on Compliance by Major Trading Trade Partners with Trade Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA, BIT- and 
Report on the WTO Inconsistency of Trade Policies by Major Trading Partners. Available: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/index_report.html.  
39 JMC, Issues and Requests for Improvements on Trade and Investment Barriers in 2014. Available: 
http://www.jmcti.org/cgibin/main_e.cgi?Kind=Country.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Mainichishimbun, Jidousha kanzei: EPA hurikoude kyougi nihonnseihuiIndonesia to(Japanese government will have 
meeting with Indonesia about the non-implementation of EPA rules of automobile tariffs), 27 May 2015. Available: 
http://mainichi.jp/shimen/news/20150527ddm008020053000c.html, [published in Japanese]. 
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are substantial differences in the tariff rate set for automobile import from Japan to 
Indonesia and the terms set forth in the JIEPA. 
Table 1.1. Tariff Rate Indonesian Domestic Rule and JIEPA 
 
 
SOURCES: Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (No.209/PMK.011/2012) 
on Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia (No. 95/PMK.011/2008) on Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japanese 
government (MOFA), the JIEPA Annex 1 referred to in Chapter 2 Schedules in relation to Article 20. 
 
According to the JIEPA, the tariff rate is supposed to be 20% from 2012 and 5% 
from 2016. However, in the Indonesian domestic rule the tariff rate in 2012 is 30.9%, 
28.1% in 2013, 25.3% in 2014, 22.5% in 2015, 19.7% in 2016, 16.9% in 2017, and 14.1% 
in 2018. Nikkei reports that Japanese automobile companies lost an estimated 2 billion 
yen ($19 million) in 2013 due to the overcharge.42 In 2012 the difference between the 
Indonesian import tariff rate and JIEPA rate was 10.9% as seen in Table 1.1. The 
difference was 8.1% in 2013, 5.3% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. Details of the Indonesian 
domestic rule and the JIEPA are shown in the Appendix B. As Figure 2 indicates, the tariff 
rate of Indonesian domestic rule is higher than the tariff rate of the JIEPA. 
  
                                                   
42 Nikkei Asia Review, Japan may sue Indonesia for tariff overcharge, February 9, 2014. Available: 
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-may-sue-Indonesia-for-tariff-overcharge, 
[published in Japanese]. 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
IND rule 30.9% 28.1% 25.3% 22.5% 19.7% 16.9% 14.1%
JIEPA 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Difference of Automobile Tariff Rate between Indonesian Domestic Rule and 
JIEPA 
It appears that Indonesia is trying to decrease automobile imports from Japan. 
According to the Japanese media, the Indonesian government is frustrated about the 
increased trade deficit with Japan after the implementation of the JIEPA. 43 Figure 3 
plots automobile imports from Japan to Indonesia: they increased rapidly until 2012 and 
thereafter, automobile imports from Japan decreased as Indonesian adopted a higher 
tariff rate. If that was Indonesian intention in violating the JIEPA tariff rates, it was 
apparently quite successful.  
  
                                                   
43 The Daily Jakarta Shimbun, “Boueki akaji, younin dekinai” EPA minaoshi motomeru kougyoushou soukyokutyou (The 
director general of the Ministry of Industry of Indonesia says “We cannot accept a trade deficit.” Indonesia asks for 
the review of the JIEPA), 13 January 2015. Available: http://www.jakartashimbun.com/free/detail/22753.html, 
[published in Japanese]. 
Tariff rate made by Indonesia 
Tariff rate of JIEPA 
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Figure 3. Import Value of Motor Vehicles by Japan to Indonesia (Million US$), 2000-201444 
 
In order to resolve the problem, the Japanese government discussed the issue 
with Indonesia first at the Trade Ministerial meeting during APEC in Surabaya in April 20 
and 21, 2013. The Japanese government and Japanese industry requested that 
Indonesia fix the tariff issue in October 2013.45 Japan and Indonesia again agreed to 
discuss the review of the JIEPA at the Japan-Indonesia Bilateral summit in Tokyo in 
March 23, 2015, and again at the Ministerial meeting of the review of the JIEPA held in 
Tokyo in May 27 and 28, 2015. However, this problem has not been resolved yet and 
Japan has not formally initiated a dispute settlement procedure based on the JIEPA as of 
March 1, 2016, and has no apparent plans to do so. This problem illustrates that instead 
                                                   
44 Statistics Indonesia. Available: http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1048. 
45 Keidanren Times, Nichi Indonesiakeizai godo forum wo Bali dekaisai-infra seibi business kankyo seibi nitsuite 
kannminn de ikennkoukann, (The Indonesian-Japan Joint Economic Forum was held in Bali. The official and private 
sector exchanged views about improvement of infrastructure and business environment), 17 October 2013, No.3150. 
Available: https://www.keidanren.or.jp/journal/times/2013/1017_02.html, [published in Japanese]. 
IND Tariff 30.9% 
JIEPA 20.0% 
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of applying a DSM to the issue, Japan has not even invoked a formal dispute process in 
its RTAs even though Japan faces disputes of its RTAs with trading partners.  
Outline of Thesis 
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze Japan’s decision to use a DSM in trade 
agreements. I try to find what affects Japan’s decision of joining a DSM in trade 
agreements. In this paper, I first look through the previous literature related to the 
use/non-use of DSMs in Chapter 2. Previous scholarship has found some theories about 
state’s use and joining of DSM. Previous experience as complainants in the WTO DSM,46 
forum shopping,47 herd behavior,48 fear of crowds,49 democracy,50 and industrial 
difference51 affect the decision of joining disputes, as well as differences in institutional 
designs between RTA DSMs and the WTO DSM.52 There are also existing arguments 
about power politics and fear of retaliation of the state’s use of DSM.53 My research 
adds to the literature analysis about what affects Japan’s decision of using a DSM not 
only in the WTO but also in in its RTAs with recent data. 
 Chapter 3 introduces originally collected data on Japan’s DSMs in trade 
agreements and analyzes which variables affect Japan’s decision to join a formal dispute 
                                                   
46 Gomez‐Mera, L., & Molinari, A. (2014). Overlapping institutions, learning, and dispute initiation in regional trade 
agreements: evidence from South America. International Studies Quarterly, 58(2), 269-281.  
47 Busch, M. L. (2007), supra note 34.  
48 Iida, K. (2006). Legalization and Japan: the politics of WTO dispute settlement. Cameron May.  
49 Johns, L., & Pelc, K. J. (2016). Fear of Crowds in World Trade Organization Disputes: Why Don’t More Countries 
Participate?. The Journal of Politics, 78(1), 000-000. P.289-290.  
50 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16. 
51 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007). Firms, governments, and WTO adjudication: Japan's selection of WTO disputes. 
World Politics, 59(02), 274-313.  
52 Allee, T., & Elsig, M. (2014), supra note 25. 
53 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
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settlement process at the WTO using logit model. As well as successfully replicating the 
results of existing work, the analysis demonstrates that Japan’s reluctance to use a DSM 
is related to the reluctance to sour political relations with a disputing country.  
 Chapter 4 introduces past WTO cases where Japan was a complainant or a third 
party and examines whether Japan could use a RTA DSM to these cases. After that, it 
explains how some important explanatory variables affect Japan’ decision of using a 
DSM. 
 Chapter 5 concludes with suggestions for improvement of Japan’s use of RTA 
DSMs. The analysis finds Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM when Japan has a RTA 
with a disputing country. When Japan has made claims many times to a disputing 
country, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with the country. The result of analysis 
implies Japan concerns using a dispute settlement may worsen the relations with a 
disputing country. If Japan thinks using a dispute settlement does not worsen the 
relations with a disputing country, Japan will use a DSM more. I suggest a DSM of 
multilateral trade agreement would mitigate Japan’s concerns of initiating a DSM.   
16 
 
CHAPTER 2  
PREVIOUS LITERATURES 
As exemplified by the Indonesian automobile case, Japan has not used RTA 
DSMs. Regarding Japan’s lack of experience in using the RTA DSM, previous literature 
provides some plausible theories as to why countries refrain. This chapter looks through 
the previous literature related to the use/non-use of DSMs. Generally, a country uses or 
joins a DSM when the benefit of initiating or joining a dispute settlement procedure is 
higher than the cost of using or joining the dispute settlement process. Adjudication 
raises costs related to administrative burden, legal precedent, and diplomatic stakes that 
concern the government.54  
In the WTO, however, when exporters have a sufficiently large share of the 
market to recoup benefits from improved access, they will use DSMs although exporters 
of other countries could free ride on their effort.55 Possible reasons states refrain from 
using a dispute settlement procedures are (1) the issue is relatively new and it is in the 
stage of consultation, (2) the damage is not so high compared to the cost of an 
arbitration or setting a panel, and (3) the possibility of losing an arbitration or a panel. 
Previous literature provides empirical evidence for all of these aspects.  
  
                                                   
54 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
55 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
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No Experience of Using the DSM in the RTA 
 Gomez-Mera and Molinari56 indicate that countries with greater experience as 
complainants in the WTO are more likely to file complaints in the South American RTAs. 
By contrast, the assumption that countries with greater experience as complainants in 
the RTA disputes are more likely to file complaints at the regional level was not 
statistically significant.57 The past use of RTA DSMs is not statistically correlated with the 
future use of RTA DSMs. This analysis indicates that multilateral experience has a 
stronger and more consistent effect than regional experience on the use of DSMs in 
South American countries.  
 Davis and Bermeo found that previous regional and the WTO experience, as 
either a complainant or respondent, influences the likelihood of initiating a DSM for 
developing countries.58 Particularly for developing nations, they found that previous 
experience was a key indicator for use of DSMs at the GATT/WTO.59 For developing 
countries, the startup costs associated with initiating a DSM can be reduced by learning 
how to use a DSM as either a complainant or respondent.60 The experience increased a 
country’s willingness to initiate future disputes in developing countries.  
 However, the results seen in South American countries and developing 
countries cannot directly apply to Japan. Although Japan has been involved with the 
                                                   
56 Gomez‐Mera, L., & Molinari, A. (2014), supra note 46.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Davis, C. L., & Bermeo, S. B. (2009). Who files? Developing country participation in GATT/WTO adjudication. The 
Journal of Politics, 71(03), 1033-1049. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
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WTO DSM in more than 20 instances, it has never used any of its RTA DSMs. Hutnick 
found that a previous regional dispute experience increased the likelihood of initiating a 
current regional dispute in a particular subject area in the WTO.61 This literature also 
found that the effects of previous experience vary: they are conditioned by a state’s 
learning capacity and the amount of previous experience. In the case of Japan, Japan 
seems to have learning capacity but Japan has not experienced regional DSMs. 
Therefore, it is challenging to verify this result. In summary, literatures on the analysis of 
the relation between past experiences of WTO/RTA DSM and future uses of RTA DSM 
cannot provide a justified explanation for why Japan has not used any RTA DSM.   
Forum Shopping/Legal Precedent 
 Forum shopping is the practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or 
court in which a claim might be heard.62 The theory of forum shopping is applicable to 
Japan when disputes are related to same rules of the WTO and RTAs but is not applicable 
when disputes are related only to rules of RTAs. Japan’s RTAs include WTO-plus/extra 
rules. Forum shopping does not happen when disputes are related to WTO-plus/extra 
rules in RTAs.  
 Busch explains the concept of forum shopping between the RTA and the WTO 
DSM and finds that a liberal country choose multilateral forum such as the WTO while 
                                                   
61 Hutnick, J. A. L. (2014). A Regional Weapon of Choice: Forum Choice in International Trade Disputes (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Pittsburgh).  
62 Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth Edition; Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 23.  
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illiberal countries choose regional forum.63 Davis mentions political lobbying is a key 
factor in the selection of institutional forum for trade negotiation.64 Froese found that 
disputes tend to go to the WTO and that proliferation of RTA DSMs has not weakened 
the importance of the WTO DSM.65 This finding is in line with Japan’s current situation 
of using a DSM. Japan has used the WTO DSM man times but has not used a RTA DSM. 
Froese mentions further research is needed to examine the use of RTA DSMs. 
 Regarding legal precedent, governments may worry about the risk of losing the 
ruling, which represents a worse outcome than the status quo because a behavior that 
had been questionable before the ruling might be legitimated as case law.66 According 
to Busch, a liberal country chooses a multilateral forum such as the WTO because it 
wants to not only win the case but also wants to use its case law in the future. On the 
other hand, an illiberal country chooses a regional forum because it wants to avoid being 
sued by other countries in the future by the case law. Based on his idea, Japan will prefer 
a multilateral forum because Japan is a liberal country, and will moreover prefer to 
utilize the WTO DSM over the RTA DSMs to resolve disputes.  
 This analysis is the same direction of Japan’s situation of Indonesian violation of 
JIEPA, but the forum shopping concept has limited applicability when there is no overlap 
between institutional rules. With respect to Japan’s current nonuse of RTA DSMs, WTO 
agreements do not cover the lower tariff rates seen in the RTAs. As the analysis can be 
                                                   
63 Busch, M. L. (2007), supra note 34.  
64 Davis, C. (2006, October). The politics of forum choice for trade disputes: Evidence from US trade policy. In Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelophia, September.  
65 Froese, M. D. (2014), supra note 2.  
66 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
20 
 
applied only when a dispute is related to the violation of same rules in the WTO and 
RTAs, forum shopping is therefore not a viable approach. Usually some rules are same in 
the WTO and RTAs but some rules in RTAs are different from the WTO. Most of RTA rules 
are new and higher level than the WTO rules.  
 Using cases quite similar to Japan’s, Puig and Tat analyzed the use of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) DSM.67 Similar to Japan’s, the AFTA DSM has never been 
used. Puig and Tat pointed out the overlap of the AFTA DSM with the WTO DSM. In this 
point, Japan’s RTAs are different from the AFTA DSM. The AFTA DSM allows member 
states to resort to fora outside of AFTA for the settlement of any disputes with other 
member states. All ASEAN member states are also members of the WTO. Therefore they 
can bring disputes arising from AFTA to either AFTA DSM or the WTO DSM as long as the 
disputes are related to similar or same rules of the WTO. On the other hand, Japan’s RTA 
DSMs do not allow states to use both the RTA DSM and the other fora at the same. In 
their argument, Puig and Tat mention the risk of developing divergent case law between 
the AFTA DSM and the WTO DSM because of the overlap of two DSMs. Inconsistencies in 
case law bring unpredictability in the future disputes and lead to forum shopping. In the 
case of Japan, Japan cannot bring the same issue to the WTO DSM and RTA DSMs at the 
same time.   
                                                   
67 Puig, G. V., & Tat, L. T. (2015), supra note 28.  
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Herd Behavior/Fear of Crowds 
 Herd behavior is a behavior that a country follows and files an identical or fairly 
similar case against the same defendant country when a major country decides to 
litigate a case against another.68 Fear of crowds means the greater the number of other 
third parties are, the less likely a country will use a DSM because negotiations become 
more complicated as more parties join.  
Iida points out that Japan’s activism in the WTO DSM could be interpreted as a herd 
behavior.69 In other words, Japan uses the WTO DSM only if other affected countries are 
bringing up the same issue. In his article, of the 11 cases in which Japan was a 
complainant, ten of them could be considered herd behavior, and only one case could be 
considered “independent” behavior. This theory seems to be able to explain Japan’s less 
use of RTA DSMs because most of Japan’s RTAs are bilateral. 
 Johns and Pelc similarly explain state behavior in joining a dispute settlement 
process as a third party as “fear of crowds”.70 However, Japan has participated in 
disputes as a third party many times. Japan seems not to have fear of crowds about 
joining a dispute.  
                                                   
68 Iida, K. (2006), supra note 48.  
69 Iida, K. (2006), supra note 48.  
70 Johns, L., & Pelc, K. J. (2016), supra note 49.  
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Democratic or Non-Democratic 
There are arguments regarding the relation between democracy and state’s 
political behavior. Democracy and legalization are closely connected.71 Some scholars 
explain the democracy and the use of DSMs. Fang shows that democratic governments 
incur higher noncompliance costs than non-democratic countries.72 Lower cost 
non-democratic countries are more likely to use a DSM than higher cost democratic 
countries.73 This result seems to be consistent with Japan’s current situation because 
Japan is a higher cost democratic country. 
According to Davis, democratic states are in favor of using courts to resolve 
international disputes. Davis says that there is a positive relationship between 
democracy and trade complaints in both the GATT and WTO and that authoritarian 
governments brought only ten disputes during the first decade of WTO adjudication.74 
Davis also shows that democracies are more likely to file legal complaints.75 
Industry Patterns 
 Davis and Shirato found that difference in industry patterns affected Japan’s 
initiation of the WTO DSM by investigating three major industries using the concept of 
velocity.76 According to Davis and Shirato, high-velocity industry is an industry which 
                                                   
71 United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/67/1, Declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on 
the rule of law at the national and international levels, Para 5. Available: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/1.  
72 Fang, S. (2010). The strategic use of international institutions in dispute settlement. Quarterly Journal of Political 
Science, 5(2), 107-131. 
73 Id.  
74 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16. 
75 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
76 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.  
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faces environments in which there is rapid and discontinuous change in demand, 
competitors, technology or regulation. High-velocity industries have many product lines 
and face rapid product turnover. Low-velocity business environment are few product 
lines and low product turnover. They researched the causal mechanisms in the context 
of firm and government decision making of the use of the WTO DSM, finding that 
high-velocity industries such as the electronic industry were less likely to initiate a WTO 
DSM and low-velocity industries such as iron and steel industry were more likely to use a 
WTO DSM. For example, the Japanese electronics firm NEC chose not to ask its 
government to challenge U.S. antidumping duties on its supercomputers in the WTO 
because it had already moved on with other strategies to improve market share and did 
not want to wait for the WTO verdict.77 This analysis may be able to apply to Japan’s 
attitude of the use of RTA DSMs. 
Institutional Design Issues in Japan’s RTA 
 Regarding the institutional design problems of the DSMs in Japan’s RTA DSMs, 
Davey’s focus on institutional legitimacy is noteworthy.78 He mentions that the WTO 
DSM is superior to the NAFTA DSM in systematic points such as the time period of 
procedures, how to choose panelists, monitoring system of implementation of the 
decisions, and the assistance of trained experts provided by the WTO secretariat to WTO 
panelists and Appellate Body members. He additionally points out a case in which the 
                                                   
77 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
78 Chapter 14 Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment, William J. Davey, Lorand Bartels and Federico 
Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System. 
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U.S. did not comply with the decision of the NAFTA DSM. A second problem with the 
NAFTA DSM is that there is no agreement on the identity of the panelists. According to 
Article 2009 of Chapter 20 in the NAFTA, the roster of the NAFTA DSM panelists is 
supposed to be appointed by consensus of member countries but the NAFTA member 
countries have not found consensus on the makeup of the roster.79 Therefore, the roster 
for the DSM of the NAFTA Chapter 20 has yet been made public.80 Different from NAFTA 
Chapter 20, the roster of the DSM based on the NAFTA Chapter 19 has been made public 
because the DSM based on NAFTA Chapter 19 does not require consensus to make the 
roster.81    
 The DSMs in the WTO are used more than the RTAs because of its greater 
legitimacy.82 In the WTO, panelists are neutral - different from the US-Canada FTA - and 
the WTO is less power-based and more rule-based than RTA DSMs. In the NAFTA DSM, 
Mexico has encountered some difficulties in obtaining compliance from the U.S.83 Davey 
mentions that many US-Mexican and US-Canadian disputes were brought to the WTO 
instead of the NAFTA DSM in the same period. He concludes the principal system for 
resolving these disputes is the WTO DSM, not the NAFTA DSM for NAFTA countries.  
                                                   
79 NAFTA Secretariat, Chapter Twenty: Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures. Available:  
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=ed3bd8c
9-2d73-45fb-9241-d66364f8037a.  
80 NAFTA Secretariat, Roster for NAFTA Dispute Settlement Panels and Committees. Available:  
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Roster-Members#1  
81 Chapter 19 of NAFTA stipulated the DSM for antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguarding. Chapter 20 of 
NAFTA are applicable to all disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the NAFTA. See, NAFTA Secretariat, 
Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions. Available: 
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-Settlement/Overview-of-the-Dispute-Settlement-Provisions#chap19.   
82 Chapter 14 Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs, supra note 78.  
83 Chapter 14 Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs, supra note 78.  
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 These points seem suggestive to improvement of Japan’s RTAs. Davey’s analysis 
can apply to current Japan’s less use of RTA DSMs because Japan’s RTA DSMs lack four 
key features of the WTO DSM: time period of consultation, automatic operation, neutral 
experts and the rules for monitoring the implementation. Japan can improve these 
points regarding its RTA DSMs.  
 According to Ahn, there are some structural drawbacks in RTA DSMs in their 
implementation stages.84 In the case of retaliation by a complaining country, the party is 
allowed to raise RTA tariffs only up to the WTO Most Favored Nations Treatment (MFN) 
level. WTO member countries cannot raise their RTA tariff rates more than the WTO 
MFN level. Ahn mentions this makes the utility of RTA DSMs significantly reduced and 
therefore the complaining country will prefer the WTO DSM. Therefore any overlapping areas 
or legal issues among the WTO and RTAs are more likely to be addressed by the WTO DSM.  
 Ahn also points out some systematic institutional problems within Asian RTA 
DSMs.85 For example, other than the AFTA Asian RTA DSMs do not have an appeal 
system or a secretariat to support dispute settlement procedures unlike the WTO DSM. 
The scope of DSMs is different among RTA DSMs and the WTO DSM. For example, 
monetary payment for setting disputes is allowed in the Korea-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement KORUS DSM but not in the WTO DSM. In the KORUS, the complaining party 
                                                   
84 Ahn, D. (2013). Dispute Settlement Systems in Asian FTAs: Issues and Problems. Asian Journal of WTO & 
International Health Law and Policy, 8(2), 421-438. 
85 Ibid. 
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may not suspend benefits if the responding party provides written notice to the 
complaining party that it will pay an annual monetary assessment.86 
 Regarding Ahn’s points, Japan’s RTA DSMs don’t have an appeal system and the 
secretariat. The scope of Japan’s RTAs is different from the WTO DSMs. For example, 
Japan-Malaysia EPA DSM does not apply to Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).87 Japan’s RTA DSMs don’t have a system 
using monetary payment for settling disputes like KORUS. 
Zangl et al analyze the effectiveness of international dispute settlement system 
from the points of three different ideas.88 Realists assert that international law does not 
work without global authority. In the real world, the implementation of international law 
depends on the relation of power politics. In this position, considering the current world 
which does not have the world government over countries, the international legal 
system does not work. Rosendoff mentions the WTO has no enforcement powers, no 
jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons, and no teargas to induce 
compliance in contrast with national law.89 Actually, there are some non-implemented 
cases in past WTO disputes. Between 1995 and 2000 in the WTO disputes, six out of 32 
cases were not implemented.90 Of these six cases, the U.S. was a respondent in four, 
                                                   
86 KORUS, art. 22.13.5. 
87 Japan-Malaysia EPA, art. 67 and 72.  
88 Zangl, B., Helmedach, A., Mondré, A., Kocks, A., Neubauer, G., & Blome, K. (2011). Between law and politics: 
Explaining international dispute settlement behavior. European Journal of International Relations, 
1354066110389832.  
89 Rosendorff, B. P. (2005), supra note 1; Bello, J. H. (1996). The WTO dispute settlement understanding: less is more. 
The American Journal of International Law, 90(3), 416-418.  
90 Zangl, et al, supra note 88.   
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consistent with the realist critique.91 If Japan does not use a DSM because of fearing of 
large power, this idea can apply to Japan’ behavior of nonuse of RTA DSMs. 
Second, institutionalists think states comply with international legal norm 
because following the international rules keeps their good reputation as a law-abiding 
member of the international community. If this is true, Japan can use a DSM with 
expectation that a respondent country will follow the decision of a panel or arbitration. 
Third, liberalists think international law can be effective only among democratic states. 
Japan may think democratic countries will abide by international rules and decisions by a 
panel or arbitration and may prefer to use its DSMs to democratic countries because non 
democratic countries may not follow the result of a panel or an arbitration. By applying 
these ideas to classification of explanatory variables, I can know which position can 
explain Japan’s decision of joining a dispute settlement process in the trade agreements. 
According to Davis, trade disputes may arise through either a failure of implementation 
in which exporters never gained the promised market access or through a new barrier 
that has been imposed in response to changed economic or political conditions.92 Davis 
mentions low levels of liberalization would be less likely to lead to widespread cheating 
since compliance is easy, and as a result enforcement would rarely be a problem. On the 
other hand, deep liberalization commitments are more likely to give rise to incentives for 
                                                   
91 Davey, W. J. (2005). Implementation in WTO Dispute Settlement: An Introduction to the Problems and Possible 
Solutions. Illinois Public Law Research Paper, (05-16).  
92 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
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cheating and encounter serious enforcement challenges.93 If Japan’s RTAs are low level 
of liberalization, this theory may apply to Japan’s nonuse of RTA DSM. However, Japan 
faces potential violations of its RTAs by other signatory countries. It cannot say Japan’s 
RTAs are low level of liberalization. 
 Table 2.1 shows the institutional differences of DSMs. The JIEPA does not have 
the appeal system, the Dispute Settlement Body, secretariat and third party system in its 
RTA DSMs different from the WTO DSM. Details of DSMs of the WTO and the JIEPA are 
shown in Appendix B.  
  
                                                   
93 Ibid.  
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Table 2.1. Institutional Differences of DSM: JIEPA versus the WTO  
 JIEPA WTO 
Members 2 162 as of April 8, 2016 
Secretariat × ○ 
Dispute Settlement body 
(DSB) 
× ○ 
List of panelists or 
arbitrators 
× ○ 
Expense of panelists or 
arbitrators 
By the Parties in equal shares From the WTO budget 
Procedures for multiple 
complaints 
× ○ 
 
Past cases 0 505 as of March 30, 2016 
Third parties × ○ 
Venue Decided by mutual consent of the 
Parties, failing which it shall 
alternate between the Parties.(Art. 
144.2) 
WTO building (as a practice) 
Appellate Body × ○ 
Surveillance of 
implementation of 
recommendations and 
rulings 
× ○ 
SOURCES: MOFA, the JIEPA; WTO, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Understanding on rules and   
procedures governing the settlement of disputes; WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases.  
  
30 
 
Asian Characteristic/Japan’s Political Context 
 There may be other probable reasons why Japan does not use RTA DSMs. For 
example, the assumption that Asian countries like Japan do not like to use an 
arbitration or a court to resolve disputes. For example, Davey mentions ASEAN 
countries are possibly more comfortable with negotiating compromises to resolve 
disputes.94 However, this idea is not necessarily true in the case of Japan since Japan 
has already used many WTO DSMs in the past. Allee and Elsig additionally cast doubt 
on assertion that “Asian culture” is not amenable to formal dispute settlement from 
their research because they discover that Asian RTAs contain stronger dispute 
settlement rules, as do agreements among Americas.95 Davey also stated that ASEAN 
countries have occasionally used the WTO system, even against each other. According 
to Puig and Tat,96 as same as Japan’s RTA DSMs, the AFTA DSM has never been used. 
Puig and Tat pointed out three problems of AFTA DSM. First is the overlap of the AFTA 
DSM with the WTO DSM. Second is the lack of standing of private parties under the 
AFTA DSM. Thirdly, Puig and Tat identified the imperfection of rules of law regarding 
AFTA DSM. Therefore the idea that Asian countries prefer negotiation to DSM for 
solving disputes is not universally true.97  
 Regarding Japan’s political context, Davis mentions the Japanese legislature 
grants considerable autonomy to the bureaucracy for management of foreign trade 
                                                   
94 Chapter 14 Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs, supra note 78.  
95 Allee, T., & Elsig, M. (2014), supra note 25. 
96 Puig, G. V., & Tat, L. T. (2015), supra note 28.  
97 Puig, G. V., & Tat, L. T. (2015), supra note 28.  
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policy. As a result, there should be lower demand for adjudication and less 
politicization of case selection for WTO disputes, because of the relative absence of 
political pressure on foreign economic policy in Japan.98 When filing complaints, 
bureaucrats and industry take the lead with little interest from the legislature. Whereas 
U.S. officials face pressure to get tough with China, Japan has been able to pursue 
patient negotiations without the need to resort to adjudication to satisfy domestic 
demands. According to Davis, Japan follows a more selective adjudication strategy and 
initiates only a few cases for large industries with less obvious political influence on 
selection.99  
Concern for Retaliation/Bargaining Power/ Tit for Tat Filing 
 One of the plausible reasons behind Japan’s reluctance to use the DSM to 
address Indonesian’s violation of the EPA may be the concern of retaliation. The 
consequences of such retaliation may include restricting visas or interrupted investment 
activities. The cost of the DSM is also one of the concerns but the reprisal is deemed to 
have higher detrimental effect to Japanese industry. Davis and Shirato echoed the same 
points, reporting that how Japanese industries expressed the concern that China would 
view a complaint as a hostile act and retaliate through other policies that could be 
harmful for business regarding the use of the WTO DSM to China.100 Davis mentions 
governments may fear that challenging a trade partner’s barrier would be linked to 
                                                   
98 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.   
99 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
100 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.  
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other economic policies, whether by countersuits in WTO adjudication or in other policy 
areas.101 The foreign government could easily adopt small measures that may worsen 
the business environment for exporters or investors related to the dispute or those in 
completely different economic sectors without engaging in actual violation of trade 
rules.102 
 In the analysis of Gent and Stephen,103 bargaining power plays important role 
in the decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication. States with greater relative 
bargaining power will be reluctant to give up decision control to an arbitral panel or 
international court unless they expect to receive a favorable ruling because they can get 
better results in bilateral negotiations. Bargaining power is relative and many potential 
components affect the bargaining power of bilateral relations.  
 According to Davey suspension of concessions has been authorized and used 
only four times in the WTO DSM.104 Davey mentions there is a general problem with 
suspension of concessions. It seems to work when threatened by a large country against 
a small country and has worked when implemented by one major power against another 
but it may not be effective remedy for a small country. On the other hand, Jung argues 
that a weaker state has less flexibility in a RTA DSM than the WTO DSM.105 The WTO 
DSM is more efficient and sophisticated to deal with trade dispute among member 
                                                   
101 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16.  
102 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16. 
103 Gent, S. E., & Shannon, M. (2011, August). Commitment Problems, Bargaining Power, and the Choice of 
International Arbitration and Adjudication. In APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper.  
104 Davey, W. J. (2005), supra note 91.  
105 Jung, Y. S. (2013), supra note 4.  
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countries by minimizing inequality across countries with power asymmetry. The more 
frequent use of the WTO DSM than the RTA DSMs might be of this reason.  
 Davis and Bermeo mention the idea of tit for tat filing, or the use of 
countersuits by respondents such as disputes between the U.S. and EC in the past WTO 
cases, in the use of DSMs in trade agreements.106 Guzman and Simmons found this 
behavior did not have a significant effect on defendant selection in WTO disputes.107 
Analysis of Determinants of Participation in WTO DSM 
 Bown analyzed the determinants of participation of all members of the WTO in 
the WTO DSMs in period between 1995 and 2000.108 His analysis shows export 
country’s trade retaliatory capacity, legal capacity and international political relations 
affect the country’s decision of using the WTO DSM. This analysis can apply to current 
Japan’s use of RTA DSMs. 
 As seen above, some arguments in previous literatures may be applicable to 
explain Japan’s decision of using the WTO DSM but there is no analysis which analyzes 
Japan’s decision of using a RTA DSM. Based on the related previous literatures, I analyze 
what affects Japan’s decision of using a DSM not only in the WTO but also in its RTAs in 
next chapter with recent data not utilized by other scholars. My analysis uses the data 
between 1995 and 2015 and the data comprise of the past WTO cases and potential 
disputes which might violate the rules of the WTO or Japan’s RTAs.  
                                                   
106 Davis, C. L., & Bermeo, S. B. (2009), supra note 58.  
107 Guzman, A. T., & Simmons, B. A. (2005). Power plays and capacity constraints: The selection of defendants in world 
trade organization disputes. The Journal of Legal Studies, 34(2), 557-598.  
108 Bown, C. P. (2005). Participation in WTO dispute settlement: Complainants, interested parties, and free riders. The 
World Bank Economic Review, 19(2), 287-310.  
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS 
Data of Japan’s RTA DSMs 
In this chapter, I systematically analyze Japan’s use of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Before the analysis, I present data from the WTO regarding Japan’s 
disputes.109 Figures 4 to 6 show the data when Japan was a complainant in the WTO 
disputes. As seen in Figure 4, Japan won the 66% of total cases in the WTO disputes 
when Japan was a complainant. Figure 5 shows the rules used in the WTO disputes when 
Japan was a complainant, GATT is most frequently used and followed by Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Subsidies, Anti-dumping, Marrakesh 
Agreement, and Safeguards. Figure 6 shows the classification of industries in cases of the 
WTO when Japan was a complainant. Automobile including tire industry, and iron and 
steel dominate more than half. These two industries plus Electric and Electronic industry, 
and Energy and natural resources industry cover more than 75%. The result reflects the 
interests of Japanese export industries. 
  
                                                   
109 WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases, supra note 3. 
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Figure 4. Result of Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Complainant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Classification of Rules used in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a 
Complainant 
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Figure 6. Classification of Industries in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a 
Complainant 
 Figure 7 to 9 show the data when Japan was a third party in the WTO disputes. 
As seen in Figure 7, when Japan was a third party, they won 60% of cases and 8% of 
cases had mutually agreed solutions. Figure 8 shows the classification of rules used in 
disputes in the WTO when Japan was a third party. When Japan is a third-party, GATT is 
the most frequently used, Anti-dumping is the second, followed by Subsidies, Marrakesh 
Agreement, Agriculture, and Protocol of Accession. Figure 9 shows the classification of 
industries in disputes in the WTO when Japan was a third party. Manufacturing 
industries, Food and Agriculture industries cover more than half. The reason why the 
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food and agriculture are high when Japan is a third party third-party may be from the 
point of defense in order to prepare for future disputes as a respondent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Result of Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Third Party 
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Figure 8. Classification of Rules used in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Third 
Party 
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Figure 9. Classification of Industries in Disputes in the WTO when Japan was a Third 
Party 
 
Logit Analysis 
As seen in Chapter 1, the Indonesian EPA automobile case is a potential Japan’s 
RTA violation. In addition, there must be other potential disputes regarding Japan’s RTAs. 
In this chapter I systematically analyze which factors affect Japan’s decision to participate 
in a dispute settlement procedure when Japan faces potential disputes. A 
methodological challenge in this project is determining the sample of potential DSM 
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cases. In order to determine potential, but not pursued, cases I coded disputes listed in 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry reports.110 
According to the METI reports,111 while there are more than 200 potential 
disputes regarding the WTO and Japan’s RTAs Japan has been a claimant in only 21 cases 
in the WTO and has participated in DSMs as a third party in 157 cases. In addition, Japan 
has never used any of its RTA DSMs. Following Bown’s approach, but using an updated 
dataset, my research is able to take into account post-2000 changes in the global 
political economy such as China’s 2001 accession to the WTO. Needless to say, China is a 
most important trade partner for Japan and the countries have many trade disputes. 
Further, after 2000, Japan has negotiated RTAs with important trading partners such as 
countries in Southeast Asia. In addition, not only BRICs but also many Southeast Asian 
countries have developed rapidly after 2000. With these changes in the global economy, 
the trade conflicts and disputes among these countries and Japan have increased. I need 
to consider these changes to analyze Japan’s decision of using a RTA DSM. In addition, 
Bown’s data include developing countries but Japan is a developed country with higher 
legal capacity, which means the result of Bown cannot necessarily apply directly to 
Japan’s specific behavior. This chapter analyzes determinants of Japan’s decision of 
participating a DSM in the WTO and RTAs using data from 1995 to 2015 referring to the 
method of Bown and other relevant literature.   
                                                   
110 Davis and Shirato also identified potential dispute cases using the METI report.  
111 METI, supra note 38.  
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Hypothesis of the analysis is that Japan is less likely to use or join a formal 
dispute settlement process when Japan thinks using a DSM worsens the relationship 
with a disputing country. I hypothesize explanatory variables related to political 
economic cost will negatively affect Japan’s decision of using a DSM. The higher the 
political economic related variables are, the less likely Japan advocates a DSM in trade 
agreements.                                                                                                             
Dependent Variable 
As a dependent variable, I use potential disputes. The dependent variable has 
two categories: participation (Y = 1) where Japan has formally participated as a 
complainant or a third party in disputes of the WTO or Japan’s RTAs; non-participation (Y 
=0) where Japan did not formally participate in dispute settlement procedure in the 
WTO or Japan’s RTAs. The data are from the annual METI reports,112 the report of the 
JMC113 and the WTO website.114 The METI and JMC reports include not only cases 
which are brought to the WTO but also potential disputes which Japan think violate rules 
of the WTO or Japan’s RTAs. Table 3.1 provides a descriptive summary of the variables. 
Data obtained from these sources cover cases in the WTO and potential 
disputes in the WTO and Japan’s RTAs between 1995 and 2015. There are 21 cases 
where Japan became a complainant in the WTO, although not all of cases have 
established a panel or are resolved. There are 157 cases where Japan joined the WTO 
                                                   
112 METI, supra note 38.  
113 JMC, supra note 39.  
114 WTO, Chronological list of disputes cases, supra note 3.  
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disputes as a third party. These 21 cases plus 157 cases are counted as participation (Y = 
1) in the analysis. 
On the other hand, there are 108 cases which may potentially violate rules of 
the WTO or Japan’s RTAs but Japan has not formally initiated the dispute settlement 
process. These 108 cases are counted as non-participation (Y =0). 
In the WTO, if a member country starts a dispute settlement procedure against 
other country, Japan can join the dispute as a third party without becoming a 
complainant. Because of the MFN rules of the WTO, if another country made a claim of 
the dispute to the WTO and wins the case, Japan can take the benefit of the result of the 
dispute. If Country A win the cases against Country B, country B must stop the measure 
violating the rules of the WTO. When Japan has incurred damage by the measure of the 
country B, if another country like country A wins the DSM, Japan can gain benefits of the 
result of the DSM without becoming a complainant. In the use of the WTO DSM, this 
type of free riding is not uncommon.115 Third-party participation is cheap but valuable: 
it allows countries to guard their interests during negotiations and to voice their views 
during litigation, without paying the cost of initiating a DSM and becoming a 
complainant.116 States can extract private benefits from settlements and voice their 
interests by participating as a third party. However, the greater the number of other 
third parties, the less likely a given country is to join because negotiations are more 
                                                   
115 Bown, C. P. (2005), supra note 108. 
116 Johns, L., & Pelc, K. J. (2016), supra note 49.  
43 
 
complicated as more parties join, which lowers the likelihood of early settlement.117 
Nevertheless, Japan’s participation as a third party is high. Japan seems to highly 
evaluate the benefit from joining as a third party compared to the risk of delayed 
settlement. Therefore, not only non-participation in a dispute but also joining as a third 
party is a behavior of free rider. Different from the WTO, Japan cannot freely ride on 
disputes as a third party in its bilateral RTAs.  
Considering the characteristics of a free rider in the use of the WTO disputes, 
Japan does not have to join the disputes as a third party. Japan can take advantage of 
the result of other countries’ DSM without joining as a third party. Japan might have 
been interested in the some WTO cases where Japan did not join as a third party. 
However, it is difficult to know which cases Japan was interested in but did not join as a 
third party. Considering the fact that Japan joined 157 cases as a third party, cases in 
which Japan participated as a third party were important and related to Japan’s trade 
interest. It is considerable that cases which Japan did not join as a third party were not 
important to Japan. Therefore, this analysis classifies Japan’s participation in the DSM as 
a third party into participation (Y =1) which means Japan has interest in these cases.  
Explanatory Variables 
 Based on the results of previous literatures, this chapter analyzes the likelihood 
of Japan’s initiation of a dispute settlement procedure using a measurements of political 
                                                   
117 Johns, L., & Pelc, K. J. (2016), supra note 49.  
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economic costs, expected benefits of formal participation of a dispute settlement 
procedure, the likelihood of success in a dispute, and effects of sector difference.  
As explanatory variables, I consider four categories, with twelve variables that 
may affect the Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM as a complainant or a third 
party. Table 3.1 shows the summary of statistics for variables with author’s predictions. 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in the Logit Model  
  
Varibale Predicted Sign Mean SD Minimum Maximum
- Dependent variable
 0 = nonpaticipant
 1 = interested third party
       or complainant
(for= 0 or 1) 0.622 0.486 0 1
- Explanatory variables
Category 1 : Political
Economic Costs
 1. Whether Japan has a
regional trade agreement
with a disputing country
(RTA WITH)
- 0.143 0.351 0 1
2. Whether a dispute country
is South East Asia
(SEA)
- 0.126 0.332 0 1
 3. Whether Japan became a
respondent claimed by a
disputing country
(TIT FOR TAT)
Unknown 0.476 0.500 0 1
 4. Whether Japan has made a
claim to a disputing party.
(DSM USE)
Unknown 0.570 0.496 0 1
  5. The number of Japan’s
claim to a disputing country
(NM DSM USE)
Unknown 2.304 2.984 0 8
 6. Log GDP per capita of a
disputing country in t-1
(GDP PER)
- 4.107 0.531 3 5
Category 2: Expected Benefits
of Formal Participation
 7. Japan's exports sent to a
disputing country as a share
of Japan's total exports in t -1
(EXPORT)
+ 0.127 0.101 0.000 0.307
 8. Log GDP of a disputing
country in t-1
(GDP)
- 12.510 0.691 10 13
Category 3 : The likelihood of
Success in a Dispute
 9. The degree of democracy
of a disputing country
(DEMO)
+ 7.353 3.659 0 10
 10. The share of the disputing
country's total exports to
Japan in t-1
(EXP TO JP)
+ 0.068 0.045 0.0024 0.2706
 11. The amount of ODA from
Japan to a disputing country
in t -1
(AID)
+ 0.942 0.351 0.0000 3.5700
Category 4: Sector effects  12.Velocity
(VELOCITY) - 0.070 0.086 0.0005 0.3410
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Category 1: Political Economic Costs 
1. Whether Japan has a preferential trade agreement with a disputing country (RTA 
WITH) 
The RTA WITH is a measurement of political economy costs: Japan may not 
want to formally participate in a DSM against a member of Japan’s RTAs because it 
would worsen relations with the country. Having RTA with countries shows that Japan 
has good relationship with these countries. Making RTAs requires a lot of efforts for 
negotiating countries. For example, Japan has negotiated a RTA with Australia for 7 years. 
The purpose making RTA is to strengthen the economic relationship with a country. 
Japan’s RTAs include DSMs but using a DSM should not threaten relationship with a 
trading partner. Japan has made RTAs with a lot of Southeast Asian countries where 
many Japanese companies trade and invest. Stable political relations among countries 
are desirable for business. I predict Japan does not use a DSM to countries when Japan 
has its RTAs with these countries, which is in line with the result of Bown.118 
2. Whether a dispute country is in Southeast Asia (SEA) 
 RTA WITH is mostly related to Southeast Asian countries because more than half 
of Japan’s RTAs are with ASEAN countries. I use a dummy variable of SEA to see the 
effect of Southeast Asian countries. As of April 15, 2016, among 14 Japan’s RTAs which 
have entered into,119 8 RTAs are with Southeast Asian countries. I predict the 
explanatory variable RTA WITH and SEA would have similar result. If the RTA WITH 
                                                   
118 Bown, C. P. (2005), supra note 108. 
119 METI, EPA/FTA/Toshi kyotei (EPA/FTA/Investment Treaties), supra note 36. 
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negatively affects Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM, SEA will also negatively 
affect Japan’s decision. Southeast Asia is politically and economically important for Japan 
especially considering the emergence of China. The relation between Japan and 
Southeast Asia is going well.120 Japan may not want to bring conflicts with Southeast 
Asian countries. I predict that Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with Southeast 
Asian countries in order to prevent the possibility of economic disputes disrupting their 
deepening diplomatic ties. 
3. Whether Japan became a respondent in past disputes of the WTO with the disputing 
trade partner (TIT FOR TAT) 
 This possible variable which may affect the Japan’s decision of joining a DSM 
shows the economic conflicting relation between Japan and a disputing country. As 
Davis and Bermeo mention, this variable can test whether Japan behaved as tit for tat 
filing in the use of DSMs in trade agreements.121 If the result is positive, this variable 
might show Japan’s retaliatory attitude against a disputing country about past legal 
action to Japan. For example, the European Union (EU)’s claim against the U.S. over the 
foreign corporations is seen as retaliation to the U.S. past two claims against EU.122,123  
4. Whether Japan made a claim at least one time to a disputing country in the WTO 
(DSM USE) 
                                                   
120 Nguyen, P. (2016), Southeast Asia Dances to the Tune of Japan’s Abe Doctrine, Southeast Asia from Scott Circle, 
7(6).  
121 Davis, C. L., & Bermeo, S. B. (2009), supra note 58.  
122 WT/DS108. 
123 Iida, K. (2004), supra note 19.  
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This variable shows Japan’s past experience to make a claim to a disputing 
country. If the result is positive, Japan tends to use or join a DSM to some specific 
countries more frequently than to other countries. Japan may think it is easy to make a 
claim or join the dispute as a third party to the specific country more than other 
countries from the point of political cost. Japan may think joining a dispute does not 
worsen the relation with these countries. If the result is negative, Japan may not want to 
formally participate in a DSM against some specific countries again. Japan may think 
joining a dispute worsens the relation with countries. The data are from the webpage of 
the WTO.124  
5. The number of Japan’s claim to a disputing country (NM DSM USE) 
This variable can show whether Japan tends to make a claim or join a dispute as 
a third party to specific countries. Japan may think it is easy to make a claim or join the 
dispute as a third party to specific countries more than other countries from the point of 
political cost. Japan may think joining a dispute does not worsen the relation with these 
countries. If the result is negative, Japan tends not to participate in a DSM again. Japan 
may think joining a dispute frequently to same countries worsens the relation with these 
countries.  
6. Log GDP per capita of a disputing country in t-1 (GDP PER) 
Some scholars such as Kim use a Log GDP per capita as a variable of legal 
capacity but at the same there are some discussions of the appropriateness of using this 
                                                   
124 Ibid. 
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variable as a measurement of legal capacity.125 For example, Busch et al question of 
using log GDP per capita as a measurement of legal capacity.126 Considering the 
discussion, I use this variable as an economic measurement of country’s development, 
rather than making conclusions about a country’s legal capacity. Although some 
countries such as China and India have large GDP as a country but GDP per capita of 
these countries are low. Some small countries and jurisdictions such as Singapore and 
Hong Kong show high GDP per capita although their GDP is small. GDP per capita may 
positively affect Japan’s decision of joining a dispute differently from GDP, which means 
Japan prefers to use a DSM to developed countries or negatively affect Japan’s decision 
of joining a dispute settlement procedure. These data are from the World Bank127 and 
the Taiwan’s National statistics.128 In the analysis of Kim129, this variable was negative 
regarding imposition of antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) and 
also negative in his 2 models regarding initiation of a request for consultation to AD/CVD. 
I predict Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM to a developed country because Japan 
may think the disputes would be solved by negotiation with developed country. Japan 
may think developed countries are more likely to respect the result of negotiation 
although it is not legally binding. On the other hand, Japan may think developing 
countries are more likely to overturn the non-binding result of negotiation, or that it is 
                                                   
125 Kim, M. (2008). Costly procedures: divergent effects of legalization in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
procedures. International Studies Quarterly, 52(3), 657-686.  
126 Busch, M. L., Reinhardt, E., & Shaffer, G. (2009). Does legal capacity matter? A survey of WTO Members. World 
Trade Review, 8(04), 559-577.  
127 World Bank, GDP per capita (current US$). Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.  
128 Taiwan, National Statistics. Available: http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=37408&CtNode=5347&mp=5.   
129 Kim, M. (2008), supra note 125.  
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not easy to negotiate with developing countries because of their weak governance 
capacity. Developing countries also may not negotiate the issue sincerely without a 
formal compulsory dispute settlement process. For example, Venezuela tried to dismiss 
the award of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.130 If 
there is no legal binding dispute settlement system, countries like Venezuela may not 
negotiate to resolve disputes. Therefore Japan may think a legally binding DSM is 
preferable for resolving disputes with developing countries, whereas the country does 
not need to resort to a DSM to resolve disputes with developed countries.  
Category 2: Expected Benefits of Formal Participation  
7. Japan’s exports sent to a disputing country as a share of Japan’s total exports in t -1 
(EXPORT) 
 A variable of Japan’s exports sent to the disputing country as a share of Japan’s 
total exports in year t -1 (EXPORT) is a measurement of the importance of the disputing 
country is as export market. Following Bown,131 I use the year before the initiation of 
the DSM. If the result of the analysis is positive, Japan tends to join the DSM as a 
complainant or a third party to the country to which Japan exports a lot. The data are 
from the Ministry of Finance of Japanese government (MOF).132 I predict EXPORT will 
have a positive effect on DSM initiation. It is natural to think that Japan formally initiate 
a dispute settlement process against a country to which Japan exports a lot. The amount 
                                                   
130 Business Wire, Gold Reserve Reports U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Enters Judgment against 
Venezuela in Excess of $760 Million; Denies Motion to Stay Enforcement. Available: 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151123005971/en/Gold-Reserve-Reports-U.S.-District-Court-District.  
131 Bown, C. P. (2005), supra note 108.  
132 MOF, Boueki toukei (Trade Statistics of Japan). Available: http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time.htm.   
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of damage from the violation of trade agreements is high when the amount of export 
from Japan is large. Japan’s expected benefit from the winning of DSM is higher than the 
cost of DSM when EXPORT is high. 
8. Log GDP of disputing country in year t-1 (GDP) 
The GDP of a disputing country is a measurement of the size of economy of a 
disputing country. As Davis and Shirato mention, larger markets offer more economic 
opportunities for Japan’s industry but at the same time larger markets may have more 
bargaining power.133 Japan may be more active or less active to participate in a dispute 
settlement process against a large economy considering the size of economy. This 
variable is related to the idea of realism. If Japan does not want to make a claim to a 
larger economy, it may suggest Japan’s behavior is close to realism position. The data are 
from the World Bank134 and Taiwan’s National statistics.135 In the analysis of Davis and 
Shirato, this variable was not statistically significant but the coefficient was negative 
regarding a Japan’s initiation of a WTO DSM. Considering the result, I predict negative to 
this variable.  
Category 3: The Likelihood of Success in a Dispute 
9. The degree of democracy of a disputing country (DEMO) 
                                                   
133 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.  
134 World Bank, GDP at market prices (current US$). Available: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.  
135 Taiwan, supra note 128.   
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According to the analysis of countries’ behaviors in international dispute 
settlement by Zangl et al,136 it can be said the higher democratic ratio in the 
international organization would contribute to the higher level of judicialization. The 
declaration of United Nation also says “We reaffirm that human rights, the rule of law 
and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing…”137 Davis additionally 
mentions “the close connection between democracy and judicial institutions within a 
state is widely recognized.”138 In this analysis, I use a degree of democracy as variable 
for a measurement of the rule of law in a disputing country. According to Fang,139 
democratic governments incur higher noncompliance costs than their non-democratic 
states due to their exposure to domestic sources of noncompliance costs that 
non-democracies are not subject to. Domestic interests groups and free media in a 
democracy play a significant role in publicizing a government’s failure in working with 
international institutions.   
Japan may expect higher democratic countries will more follow the results of 
disputes because these countries respect the rule of law. This variable is related to the 
idea of liberalism. If the result is positive, Japan tends to initiate a DSM to democratic 
countries which is in line with the concept of liberalism.140 The data are from the Polity 
                                                   
136 Zangl,et al, supra note 88.  
137 United Nations, General Assembly, A/RES/67/1, Declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on 
the rule of law at the national and international levels, Para 5. Available: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/1.  
138 Davis, C. L. (2012), supra note 16; LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silane, F., Pop-Eleches, C., & Shleifer, A. (2003). Judicial 
checks and balances (No. w9775). National Bureau of Economic Research.; Stephenson, M. C. (2003). “When the devil 
turns…”: The political foundations of independent judicial review. The Journal of Legal Studies, 32(1), 59-89.  
139 Fang, S. (2010), supra note 69.  
140 Zangl, et al, supra note 88.  
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IV, a standard measure of democracy used in the literature.141 The data of Hong Kong 
and the EU are missing in the data of Polity IV, and I used the variable mean for Hong 
Kong and used the average democracy of the EU member countries for the the EU. In 
the analysis of Kim142, this variable is positive regarding imposition of AD and CVD in his 
2 models and also positive in initiation of a request for consultation to AD/CVD.  
10. The share of the disputing country’s total exports to Japan in t-1 (EXP TO JP) 
Disputing country’s exports sent to Japan as a share of disputing country’s total 
exports in year t -1 means the Japan’s trade retaliation capacity to the disputing country 
according to Bown.143 This variable is a measurement of trade retaliation capacity of 
Japan and related to the idea of realism. Due to the self-enforcing nature of the WTO 
and RTA DSMs, exporting countries can enforce their rights only through actual or 
implicit threats of retaliation against trading partners. As an enforcement tool, Japan 
may increase the import tariff rates from the disputing country if the disputing country 
does not follow the decision of the DSM. Japan may be more likely to participate in a 
DSM when this variable is high. The data are from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EC.144 In the analysis of Bown145, this 
variable is positive regarding likelihoods of becoming a complainant or a third party.  
11. The amount of ODA from Japan to a disputing country in t -1 (AID) 
                                                   
141 Polity IV, Polity IV Country Reports 2010. Available: http://www.systemicpeace.org/p4creports.html.  
142 Kim, M. (2008), supra note 125.   
143 Bown, supra note 108.  
144 OECD, OECD. Stat. Available: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BTDIXE_I4; EC, TRADE Market Access 
Database, Statistics. Available: http://madb.europa.eu/madb/statistical_form.htm.  
145 Bown, supra note 108.  
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Japan gives official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries. The 
amount of ODA in year t-1 is also a measurement of trade retaliation capacity of 
exporter to a disputing country.146 Japan can decrease or stop ODA to disputing 
countries as an enforcement tool if they don’t follow the result of the DSM. Japan may 
be more likely to participate in a DSM when this variable is high. These data are from the 
MOFA.147 In his analysis Bown finds that the recipient of bilateral aid received from 
exporter was negative. Japan will not use or join a DSM when AID is high.148 
Category 4: Sector Effects 
12. Velocity (VELOCITY) 
Davis and Shirato149 analyze how industry patterns affect the initiation of the 
WTO DSM. The analysis is also an important reference. Davis and Shirato used the 
Research and Development (R&D) ratio to total sale or production as the velocity to 
measure which may affect the probability of dispute initiation. Davis and Shirato 
explained the difference of velocity among industries. That is, higher velocity industries 
such as electronics industries are less likely to use the DSM but lower velocity industries 
such as iron and steel industries are more likely to use the DSM. In order to examine the 
affection of industrial difference to the Japanese DSM initiation, this thesis uses the R&D 
ratio to total value added of each industry as an explanatory variable. The R&D ratio to 
total value added means total R&D expenditures over the total value added in a year 
                                                   
146 Bown, supra note 108.  
147 MOFA, ODA Jisseki (ODA results). Available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/jisseki.html, 
[published in Japanese].  
148 Bown, supra note 108.  
149 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51. 
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measured by current prices as a velocity of industry. This variable is used to measure the 
stability of a business environment, degree of technological instability, and 
innovativeness.150 
The data of R&D expenditures and the data of value added of each industry in 
Japan are from the OECD.151 I used 2008 data because 2008 data is most recent 
available in the OECD database regarding Japan. In the analysis of Davis and Shirato, 
total production is used but the OECD data do not show the total production of services, 
I used the value added instead to include service industries in the analysis. According to 
Davis and Shirato,152 the result is negative. For example, high velocity industries such as 
electronic industry are less likely to use a DSM but low velocity industries such as iron 
and steel industry are more likely to use a DSM. High velocity sectors are as follows. 
Chemical industry is 34.1%. Electric and electronic industry is 23%. Automobile industry 
is 17.8%. Manufacturing is 11.5%.  
I examine this variable in this analysis with data from the WTO153 and the METI 
and JMC report.154 In the analysis of Davis and Shirato, this variable is negative 
regarding a Japan’s initiation of a WTO dispute.  
 
                                                   
150 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.  
151 OECD.Stat, STAN R&D expenditures in Industry (ISIC Rev. 3). Available:  
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANBERD2011_REV3; OECD.Stat, STAN Database for Structural 
Analysis. Available: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STAN08BIS.  
152 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.  
153 WTO, Find disputes cases, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm#results.   
154 METI, supra note 38; JMC, supra note 39. 
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Analysis 
In the analysis, I use a logit model appropriate to the categorical nature of the 
dependent variable. In model 1, I use all of 12 explanatory variables. In the model 2, in 
order to check whether these variables are good to fit our model, I use the likelihood 
ratio test. As the result of the likelihood ratio tests, seven variables are fit to the model. I 
use these seven explanatory variables in model 2. In model 3, I replace RTA WITH by SEA 
because more than half of Japan’s RTAs consist of Southeast Asian countries. The results 
are summarized in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2. The Result of the Logit Model 1 and 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signif. Codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 
Model 1 ; AIC 303.24, N 286 
Model 2; AIC 315.2, N 286 
Model 3; AIC 326.78, N 286 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Japan's participation of DSM
Explanatroy Varibale
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 12.13746
(0.04740)
 3.10547.
(0.059218)
1.41132
(0.33574)
Category 1 : Political
Economic Costs
 1. Whether Japan has a
regional trade agreement
with a disputing country
(RTA WITH)
-2.10116***
(0.000196)
-2.05996***
(0.000411)
-
2. Whether a dispute country
is South East Asia
(SEA)
-4.32388**
(0.00218)
 -0.31928
(0.589214)
 -1.39347**
(0.00305)
 3. Whether Japan became a
respondent claimed by a
disputing country
(TIT FOR TAT)
0.04687
(0.95495)
- -
 4. Whether Japan has made a
claim to a disputing party.
(DSM USE)
-0.30726
( 0.50588)
- -
  5. The number of Japan’s
claim to a disputing country
(NM DSM USE)
-0.10833
(0.24912)
-0.23432**
(0.002027)
-0.23844**
(0.00138)
 6. Log GDP per capita of a
disputing country in t-1
(GDP PER)
-2.38342*
(0.01853 )
-1.15749*
(0.012542)
-0.73860.
(0.07600)
Category 2: Expected Benefits
of Formal Participation
 7. Japan's exports sent to a
disputing country as a share
of Japan's total exports in t -1
(EXPORT)
 5.00196
(0.26407)
9.81048***
(0.000158)
10.51242***
(4.08e-05)
 8. Log GDP of a disputing
country in t-1
(GDP)
0.12468
(0.796605)
- -
Category 3 : The likelihood of
Success in a Dispute
 9. The degree of democracy
of a disputing country
(DEMO)
0.28779**
(0.00115)
0.31368***
(8.26e-08)
 0.27028***
(8.40e-07)
 10. The share of the disputing
country's total exports to
Japan in t-1
(EXP TO JP)
31.06082**
(0.00247)
- -
 11. The amount of ODA from
Japan to a disputing country
in t -1
(AID)
-0.92168*
(0.01320)
- -
Category 4: Sector effects  12.Velocity
(VELOCITY)
 -4.85744**
( 0.00447)
 -5.04456**
(0.001915)
-4.30484**
(0.00637)
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Results 
Regarding the political economic variables in category 1, model 1 shows that 
RTA WITH, SEA and GDP PER are statistically significant and negative. In models 2 and 3, 
RTA WITH, NM DSM USE and GDP PER are statistically significant and negative. From the 
results, we can see that Japan is a risk-averse country in using or joining a DSM when it 
considers the political economy costs. Japan particularly tends to avoid using or joining a 
DSM when it has an RTA with a disputing country. This finding is same as Bown’s finding 
that political economy costs of international relations make it less likely that an exporter 
will participate in a trade dispute when the respondent is politically important to the 
exporter.155 More than half of Japan’s RTAs are with Southeast Asian countries and 
others are countries in Asia Pacific region except Switzerland.156 These countries are 
politically and economically important for Japan. Especially Japan and Southeast Asian 
countries share common interest against the threat of emerging China. In model 3, I 
replaced RTA WITH by SEA to see the effect of Southeast Asian countries. The result of 
SEA is statistically significant and negative, similar to RTA WITH in model 2. Japan is less 
likely to use or join a DSM with Southeast Asian countries, which shows Japan thinks 
Southeast Asia is politically important. Japan’s behavior of using DSM reveals how the 
region is import for Japan.  
Japan is also less likely to use or join a DSM when Japan has used DSMs with a 
disputing country. The more frequently Japan made claims to a disputing country, the 
                                                   
155 Bown, C. P. (2005), supra note 108.  
156 METI, EPA/FTA/Toshi kyotei (EPA/FTA/Investment Treaties), supra note 36. 
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less likely Japan uses or joins a DSM to the country. The results of GDP PER show Japan is 
less likely to use a DSM to developed countries same as the prediction. Japan seems to 
prefer to use legally binding process to resolve disputes with developing countries. 
Developing countries might more easily and unreasonably overturn the non-binding 
agreement than developed countries or they may not sincerely negotiate the issue 
without formal compulsory dispute settlement process. Indonesia, India, Philippines, 
Egypt and China are five countries that have small GDP PER.  
The control variables in categories 2 and 3 largely affirm the findings of previous 
studies. Regarding category 2, in models 1, 2 and 3, as I expected, EXPORT is positive. 
Disputes with highest amounts of Japan’s export sent to a disputing party as a share of 
Japan’s total export are mainly related to disputes with the United States. The top five 
values of EXPORT which are related to 35 disputes are disputes with the U.S. The 
variable GDP does not fit to the model in the result of likelihood ratio test. 
Regarding category 3 in model 1, all three variables are statistically significant. 
DEMO and EXP TO JP are positive. AID is negative. In models 2 and 3, only DEMO is 
statistically significant as the result of likelihood ratio test. DEMO is positive in the model 
1, 2 and 3 as I expected. This result is same as our prediction and is in line with the idea 
of liberalism. Countries with more than 9 score of democracy are Australia, Canada, 
Chile, EU, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Mongolia, Poland, Taiwan, UK, and the U.S.  
The result of EXP TO JP in model 1 is positive, which means Japan tends to join a 
dispute with a country to which Japan has a retaliatory capacity as expected. The result 
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of AID is negative which is different from expectation. Japan seems not to relate trade 
disputes with foreign aid. Japan may think ODA is just a tool to make a good relation 
with developing countries. The result may imply although Japan has a trade dispute with 
a developing country, Japan does not threat the country by stopping or decreasing ODA 
or may imply the amount of ODA cannot be used as a tool to retaliate to the disputing 
country when a trade dispute happens.  
The U.S. is strongly related to EXPORT and DEMO. India is strongly related to 
GDP PER and EXP TO JP. These results are interesting. Japan is less likely to use or join a 
DSM with higher GDP per capita country.  
Regarding category 4, the results of VELOCITY are statistically significant and 
negative in both models 1 and 2. These are same as the prediction and in line with Davis 
and Shirato. Japanese high velocity industries such electronic industries are less likely to 
use a DSM.  
 Figure 10 shows the marginal effects of model 2. Marginal effects of VELOCITY, 
RTA WITH, SEA, NM DSM USE, EXPORT and DEMO do not cover 0. Marginal effects of 
EXPORT and DEMO are positive and the marginal effect of others are negative. The 
marginal effect of EXPORT is positively high and VELOCITY is negatively high. Figure 11 
shows the marginal effects of model 3. In model 3, VELOCITY, SEA, NM DSM USE, 
EXPORT and DEMO do not cover 0. Marginal effects of EXPORT and DEMO are positive 
and the marginal effect of others are negative. 
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Figure 10. Marginal Effect of Model 2 
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Figure 11. Marginal Effect of Model 3 
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Summary and Arguments 
 From the analysis, there are seven important variables which are statistically fit 
and affect Japan’s decision of joining a DSM: 1. RTA WITH (-), 2. SEA (-), 3. NM DSM USE 
(-), 4. GDP PER (-), 5. EXPORT (+), 6. DEMO (+), and 7. VELOCITIES (-). I also found RTA 
WITH can be replaced by SEA. 
First, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with countries Japan has RTAs. 
Having RTAs with countries means not only that Japan has economically binding rules 
with these countries but also that Japan has politically good relationship with these 
countries. If Japan does not trust a country, Japan cannot make agreements stipulating 
higher level of rules with these countries. Unfortunately, disputes happen in reality 
regardless of how they are close. Japan’s RTAs are not unexceptional. Japan has disputes 
with some countries about Japan’s RTAs but Japan is reluctant to initiate or join a DSM 
with these countries. Typical countries are ASEAN countries. In model 3, I replaced RTA 
WITH by SEA and I found SEA also negatively affects Japan’s decision of using or joining a 
DSM. That shows Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with Southeast Asian countries, 
which implies Japan does not want to worsen relation with these states by using a DSM 
in trade agreements. Maintaining good relationship with Southeast Asian countries are 
politically and diplomatically important considering the emerging influence of China in 
the region. Using a DSM may not bring severe diplomatic conflicts between countries 
but ideally there should not be any concern or dispute among countries. If the disputes 
are resolved by negotiation without formal legal process, that appears to be desirable 
64 
 
for Japan especially regarding disputes with Southeast Asian countries. Further research 
will be needed to isolate the effects of signed trade agreements versus regional 
geopolitical effects. 
 Second, Japan is less likely to initiate or join a DSM with countries with whom 
Japan previously has used a DSM. The more Japan has used DSMs with a country, the 
less Japan initiates or joins a DSM with the country. Japan seems not to want to use or 
join a DSM with same countries again. It seems that Japan does not want to worsen the 
relationship with countries by using DSMs many times.  
 Third, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM with countries when their GDP per 
capita is high. Countries with high GDP per capita are developed countries. Japan may 
think it can be able to resolve disputes with developed countries without using DSMs. 
Developed countries would be more reasonably negotiable to resolve issues. On the 
other hand, negotiation with developing counties would be harder. Japan may think it 
needs to resort to formal dispute settlement process to resolve disputes when disputes 
are related to developing countries.   
 Forth, EXPORT has positive effect for Japan to join a DSM. Japan is more likely to 
join a DSM with a country Japan exports a lot. The typical countries are the U.S. and 
China. 
 Fifth, Japan is more likely to use or join a DSM with countries which have high 
degree of democracy. Not only developed countries but also some developing countries 
have higher score of democracy. In my data, countries that have more than 8 score of 
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democracy are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Philippines, Poland, Taiwan, Turkey, 
UK and the U.S. Considering the result of GDP PER and DEMO, Japan seems to be more 
likely to use or join a DSM with countries that are democratic and developing countries 
with expectation that these countries will follow the adjudication of a panel or 
arbitration.  
 Finally, Japan is less likely to use or join a DSM regarding high velocities 
industries. This result is consistent with Davis and Shirato.157 
 
  
                                                   
157 Davis, C. L., & Shirato, Y. (2007), supra note 51.  
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CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATION 
 This chapter introduces past WTO cases where Japan was a complainant or a 
third party and examines whether Japan could use a RTA DSM to these cases. After that, 
I explain how some important explanatory variables affect Japan’ decision of using a 
DSM. 
Past WTO Cases 
 Reviewing Japan’s past 21 WTO cases in Table 4.1, there is no case where Japan 
had the option to use a RTA DSM. While there are 2 cases against Indonesia, these cases 
happened before the JIEPA entered into effect. For cases where Japan was a third party, 
Table 4.2 shows that there are 9 instances where Japanese RTA DSMs could have been 
used. Japan seemed to have joined cases related to agriculture, horticulture and animal 
from the point of defense for future disputes. A country does not make a claim from the 
point of defense. Japan seems to have offensive interests in iron and steel industry. From 
the point of offense, DS456 India Electric and Electronic, DS490 and DS496 Indonesia 
Iron and steel cases seem to be related to Japanese interests.  
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Table 4.1. Japan is a Complainant 
 
  
DS No. RespondentSector Rule Status
1 6 US Automoble DSU, GATT Mutually agreed
2 51 Brazil Automobile GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
Consultation suspended.
3 55 Indonesia Automobile GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
won 
4 64 Indonesia Automobile GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
won
5 95 US Government ProcurementGP Panel dissolved
6 139 Canada Automobile GATS, GATT, Subsidies
and Countervailing
Measures, TRIMs
won
7 162 US Iron and steel Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
won
8 184 US Iron and steel Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
won
9 217 US Iron and steel, machine
parts, bearings, aircraft
equipments, forklifts,
printing machine, belts
for manufacturing
Anti-dumping, GATT,
Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
won
10 244 US Iron and steel Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
lost
11 249 US Iron and steel GATT, Safeguards won
12 322 US Iron and steel Anti-dumping, GATT,
Agreement Establishing
the WTO
won
13 376 EU IT products GATT won
14 412 Canada Renewable energy GATT, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures,
TRIMS
won
15 433 China Rare earths GATT, Protocol of
Accession
won
16 445 Argentina Import restriction on
broad industry
GATT, TRIMS, Import
Licensing, Safeguards
won
17 454 China Iron and steel Anti-dumping, GATT Be in progrss
18 463 Russia Automobile GATT, TRIMS, TBT Consultation suspended.
19 468 Ukline Automobile Safeguards, GATT Be in progrss
20 495 Korea Food GATT, SPS Be in progrss
21 497 Brazil Automotive sector, the
electronics and
technology industry
GATT, TRIMS, Subsidies
and Countervailing
Measures
Be in progrss
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Table 4.2. Japan is a Third Party 
 
 
 
 
  
DS
No.
Complain
ant
Year Respondent Sector Rule Status
1
341 EC 2006 Mexico Agriculture Agriculture,
GATT,
Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measures
won
2 430 US 2012 India Agriculture SPS, GATT won
3
455 US 2013 Indonesia Horticulture and
animal products
GATT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing
Panel
established, but
not yet
composed
4
456 US 2013 India Electric and
Electronic
GATT, TRIMS,
Subsidies and
Countervailing
Measures
Panel composed
5
477 NZ 2014 Indonesia Horticulture and
animal products
GATT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing,
Preshipment
Inspection
Panel composed
6
478 US 2014 Indonesia Horticulture and
animal products
GATT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing,
Preshipment
Inspection
Panel
established, but
not yet
composed
7
484 Brazil 2014 Indonesia Food SPS, TBT,
Agriculture,
Import
Licensing,
Preshipment
Inspection,
GATT
Panel
established, but
not yet
composed
8
490 Tiaipei 2015 Indonesia Iron and steel GATT,
Safeguards
Panel composed
9
496 Vietnam 2015 Indonesia Iron and steel GATT,
Safeguards
Panel composed
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Table 4.3. Potential Disputes 
 
  
Country
Non-use of the WTO DSM and RTA DSMs
1 Indonesia Export Restrictions on Mineral Resources and Local Content Issue.
2 Indonesia Local Content Requirement on Retails Services
3 Indonesia Quantitative Import Restrictions
4 Indonesia
Import Restrictions (compulsory registration by the importers of
pharmaceutical products, foods, beverages, footwear, electrical
equipment, children’s toys, steel products, etc.)
5 Indonesia Suspension of infringing goods at borders
6 Malaysia
Imposition on Internal Taxes on Automobiles and Import
Restrictions on Automobiles based on the Approved Permit system
7 Malaysia Excise Tax Exemption System on Domestic Automobile Parts
8 Malaysia Export Restrictions on Logs
9 Philippines Export Restrictions on unprocessed minerals
10 India 
Local content requirements (domestic-product preferential
subsidies) on domestically manufactured electronic products
Non-use of RTA DSMs
1 Indonesia Execution of the JIEPA Intellectual Property Chapter
2 Thailand
Violations of the schedule of elimination of tariffs in the Japan-
Thailand EPA
3 Thailand
Unclear implementation of the rule of local procurement parts in
the JTEPA
4  Indonesia Violation of automobile tariff of the JIEPA
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Application to Japan’s Disputes 
Figure 12 shows the correlation between the probability of Japan’s use of a 
DSM and the ratio of Japan’s export to a disputing country. The line of sample mean is 
the average score of each variable. As seen in Figure 12, the probability increases with 
the increase of export. The line goes down when a dispute is related to SEA or RTA, 
which means that when a disputing country is a Southeast Asian country or Japan’s RTA 
country, Japan’s possibility of using a DSM follows lower lines. The percentage of Japan’s 
export to each Southeast Asian country is less than 0.1. In Figure 12, the width of 
dropping line is huge in the area below the 0.3. Southeast Asian countries are located in 
the lower left corner of lower lines. Japan’s possibility to use a DSM to these countries 
are around 0.2 when the other variables are average. On the other hand, the line goes 
up when Japan does not have a RTA with a disputing country such as the U.S. Japan’s 
export to the U.S. is around 0.3. When the other variables are average, Japan’s 
probability of using or joining a DSM to the U.S. is around 0.9. 
According to Figure 12, when the share of Japan’s export to a disputing country 
is more than 0.4, the possibility of Japan’s using or joining a DSM is almost 1, which 
means when the share of export to the disputing country is more than 40%, Japan will 
use a DSM regardless of political concerns. In the original data, there is no country to 
which the share is more than 20%, but the results indicate that as export dependence 
increases so too does Japan’s willingness to litigate. If export dependence reaches 
numbers as high as 40%, we can predict that Japan will be far less hesitant to use a DSM 
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than is now observed. Under the current situation, Japan’s use or joining of a DSM is 
determined by the balance of all other factors, such as whether a country is in Southeast 
Asia or sector-level variables.  
Figure 13 shows the correlation between the probability of Japan’s use of a 
DSM and VELOCITY. The probability decreases with the increase of VELOCITY. Same as 
Figure 12, RTA and SEA down the slope. For example Southeast Asian countries are 
follow the lower slope and the U.S. follows the higher slope in Figure 13. The velocity of 
automobile is around 0.178. Japan’s probability to use or join a DSM to Southeast Asia is 
around 0.2 to 0.3 while to the U.S. is around 0.7 to 0.8 in Figure 13. 
Different from exports, although velocity is 0, the probability of Japan’s use or 
joining a DSM is less than 0.8, which means Japan may not use or join a DSM despite a 
disputing industry having low velocity. This result implies that Japan does not decide to 
use or join a DSM only by a request by an industry; if so, then we would expect a 
probably approaching 1 of DSM use when velocity is low. Although low-velocity 
industries do want the Japanese government use or join a DSM, the Japanese 
government considers the other factors such as political relations. For example, in Figure 
3, if a disputing country is a Southeast Asian country, Japan is less likely to use or join a 
DSM although the relevant industries have low velocity.  
 A brief discussion of the case of Indonesian automobile tariff violations is 
illuminating. Indonesia is a Southeast Asian and its violation of Japan’s RTA is related to 
relatively high velocity automobile industry. Japan has RTA with Indonesia. These 
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elements negatively affect the likelihood of using less DSMs generally in the statistical 
model, and help us understand why the Japanese government has not taken action 
despite the clear economic losses from the high tariff levels. According to the METI and 
JMC reports, there are at least 14 cases which may violate rules of either the WTO or 
Japan’s RTAs. 10 cases might violate rules of both of the WTO and RTAs. Table 4.3 shows 
4 potential cases with Japan’s RTAs and all of 4 cases are related to Southeast Asian 
countries. On the other hand, among 21 Japan’s claimant’s cases in the WTO in Table 4.1, 
just two are from Southeast Asia, and are with Indonesia but 8 cases are with the U.S. 
These are in line with the probability analysis of Japan’s using or joining a DSM in Figure 
12 and 13. Figure 4.1 shows Japan started to use a DSM against China recently. That 
reflect the increase of Japan’s export to China, which affects the Japan’s probability to 
use or joining a DSM.    
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Figure 12. Export Dependence and DSM Use 
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Figure 13. Sector Velocity and DSM Use 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION   
  When a country decides whether it should use a DSM, it considers the costs 
and benefits. Two sets of costs are considerable: litigation costs such as hiring lawyers 
and payment for arbitrators and the political economy costs. Benefits are related to the 
damage brought by a disputing country’s measure violating the international trade rules. 
When costs of using the DSM are higher than the benefits, a country will not pursue 
litigation. The analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the following seven variables affect 
Japan’s decision of joining a DSM: RTA WITH (-), SEA (-), NM DSM USE (-), GDP PER (-), 
EXPORT (+), DEMO (+), and VELOCITY (-). Among them, I need to pay attention to 
variables that negatively affect Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM. Variables RTA 
WITH, SEA, NM DSM USE, GDP PER and VELOCITIY negatively affect Japan decision of 
joining a DSM. Especially, RTA WITH, SEA, NM DSM USE and GEP PER are related to 
political economic cost and are related to Japan’s concern for worsening relationship 
with disputing countries. 
 For example, in the dispute of “Indonesia, Export Restrictions on Mineral 
Resources and Local Content Issue”, since the Indonesian Parliament passed the Mining 
Law in December 2008, Japanese government has expressed its concerns to the 
Indonesian government at least 16 times in many occasions.158 Japan expressed their 
                                                   
158 METI, 2014 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Partners with Trade Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA and IIA -, 
Part I Problems of Trade Policies and Measures in Individual Countries and Regions, Chapter 2 ASEAN. Available: 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/2014WTO/01_02.pdf.  
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concerns to Indonesia in December 2009, February, June, September, October, and 
November 2011, February, June, August and October 2012, September, October and 
December 2013, March 2014 and May and June 2015. In this dispute, Japan has pursued 
negotiation to resolve the issue instead of using a DSM more than 7 years.159 As seen in 
this case, Japan has avoided using the DSM. In this case, Japan seems to hesitate to use 
a DSM. Negotiating a same issue more than 7 years is too long. If Japan used a DSM, the 
issue would have been solved earlier than 7 years. Japan seems to avoid using a DSM 
caring relationship with Indonesia. 
 Ideally using a DSM should not affect the relation of countries. In order to 
improve Japan’s non participation in a DSM because of fearing worsening diplomatic 
relations especially with Southeast Asian countries, there needs some systems which 
ensure using a DSM does not decrease political economic relations with a disputing 
country. If Japan thinks using a DSM does not worsen the relations with a disputing 
country, Japan will join a dispute settlement procedure more. Otherwise, Japan will 
continue to pursue unofficial negotiation to resolve the dispute rather than joining an 
official dispute settlement process. This is similar to the idea of herd behavior. Of course, 
when other variables which positively affect Japan’s decision of using or joining a DSM 
are very high, Japan joins a DSM. When EXPORT is very high and VELOVITY is low, Japan 
will use a DSM. However, that means Japan allows countries to violate trade agreements 
in some conditions. In order to ensure fair business environment, this situation should 
                                                   
159 Ibid.  
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be avoided. Regarding this Japan’s RTA problems, Davey made interesting comments 
about the retaliation in case of non-compliance of the WTO DSM decisions.160 Davey 
explained probably only the most powerful members like the U.S. and the EU can use 
retaliatory action as the ultimate sanction under the WTO rules. It appears that informal 
pressures to comply are much greater in the WTO than the RTA.  
 Considering the result of the analysis and Davey, multilateral international DSM 
including powerful members such as the U.S. and EU would be a solution to improve 
Japan’s use of RTA DSMs. Although a country violates the rules of multilateral trade 
agreements, not only Japan but also other countries may try to resolve the problem. 
Japan does not have to be fear of worsening relation with the disputing country. In the 
past, Japan was fearful of using a DSM with China and Korea but Japan has started to use 
the WTO DSMs with both countries.161 The violation of rules of a disputing country is 
less likely to become bilateral problems in multilateral DSMs. Joint action seems suitable 
way for Japan in using a DSM in trade agreements. I suggest a DSM of multilateral trade 
agreement would mitigate Japan’s concerns of using a DSM in trade agreements.  
 All of Japan’s RTAs which have come into effect are bilateral. Therefore Japan 
cannot collaborate with other countries to make a claim to a disputing country in Japan’s 
current RTAs, which means these disputes inevitably become bilateral issues between 
Japan and the disputing country. Therefore within the institutional structure of Japan’s 
                                                   
160 Davey, W. J. (2005), supra note 91.   
161 Davis, C. (2003, August). Setting the negotiation table: the choice of institutions for trade disputes. In American 
Political Science Association Conference, at Philadelphia; WTO DS 433, 454, 495 and 504 
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current RTAs, political economic costs largely affect Japan’s decision making. If the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is ratified in the future, these dynamics have the 
potential to change. The TPP consists of 12 countries and includes 4 Southeast Asian 
countries: Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.162 After the TPP is implemented, 
Japan can collaborate with other TPP members to use a DSM, for example, when Japan 
faces disputes with a Southeast Asian TPP member, which will mitigate the Japan’s 
concerns of worsening a relation with the disputing country. Multilateral DSMs will 
dilute the tension between two countries brought by disputes in trade agreements, and 
Japan will be able to avoid bilateral disputes in multilateral trade agreements. 
 Using a DSM can constitute a real diplomatic cost. Once formal litigation occurs 
between 2 countries, it becomes a diplomatic issue subject to domestic political 
pressures and media attention. However, it the disputes are not bilateral but multilateral, 
the situation will be different: the respondent country cannot effectively retaliate 
against many claimants and the dispute does not become bilateral diplomatic problems.  
 In the future, there is some room to expand my research. For example, I found 
the velocity of industry as an important explanatory variable for Japan’s use of a DSM 
but the business strategy of each company in an industry may be different. Although A 
company and B company are in same industry, their supply chains may be different. The 
difference of business of a company may prefer different position to use a DSM. Japan’s 
decision not to litigate in an automobile tariff dispute with Indonesia might have less to 
                                                   
162 United States Trade Representative, the TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP. Available: https://ustr.gov/tpp/.  
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do with the velocity of the auto sector and more to do with firms’ dependence on 
suppliers or component manufacturers in Indonesia and not wanting to disturb that 
status quo. If positions of a use of DSM among countries in an industry are different, the 
industry cannot ask their government to use a DSM. Further research can explore 
industry effects more as well as the effects of global supply integration.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Tables of Japan-Indonesia EPA Automobile Tariff Rates 
 The JIEPA came into effect in July 2008. In the JIEPA, the import tariffs to 
automobile classified as HS 8703.23 in the Schedule of Indonesia are as follows.  
Table A.1. Schedule of Indonesia of the JIEPA163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
163 MOFA, the JIEPA Annex 1 referred to in Chapter 2 Schedules in relation to Article 20. Available:  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/epa0708/annex1.pdf.  
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(Customs duties on originating goods classified under the tariff lines indicated with “P” shall be as provided for in the 
terms and conditions set out in the note indicated in Column 5 in each Party’s Schedule. ) 
 Notes 13 and 14 in the schedule above mean as follows; 
 Part 3 Section 1 Notes for Schedule of Indonesia in the JIEPA Annex 1164 
13. The rate of customs duty shall be reduced in accordance with the following:   
 (a) 60.0 percent, as from the date of entry into force of this Agreement;  
(b) 20.0 percent, as from January 1, 2012; and   
 (c) 5.0 percent or the rate of customs duty applied by Indonesia at the time of 
importation under the AKFTA, whichever is the less, as from January 1, 2016.  
 14. The rate of customs duty shall be reduced in accordance with the following:   
 (a) 45.0 percent, as from the date of entry into force of this Agreement;   
 (b) 20.0 percent, as from January 1, 2012; and   
 (c) 5.0 percent or the rate of customs duty applied by Indonesia at the time of 
importation under the AKFTA, whichever is the less, as from January 1, 2016.    
  
                                                   
164 Ibid.  
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Table A.2. Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia (No.209/PMK.011/2012) on Import Duty Tariff Setting in the JIEPA165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
165 Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (No.209/PMK.011/2012) on 
Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA.  
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Table A.3. Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia (No. 95/PMK.011/2008) on Import Duty Tariff Setting in the JIEPA166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
                                                   
166 Appendix of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia (No. 95/PMK.011/2008) on 
Import duty Tariff setting of the JIEPA.  
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As seen in Table A.1, the tariff rate to Complete Build-up (CBU) motor cars whose 
cylinders are exceeding 1500cc and less than 3000cc are categorized as P13 or P14. Both 
P13 and P14 mean import tariff rates are supposed be 20.0 percent from January 1, 
2012 and 5.0 percent from January 1, 2016. However as seen in Table A.2 and A.3, the 
import tariff rates to automobiles other than Sedan and station wagons are higher than 
the rates of JIEPA. According to Table A.2 and A.3, Indonesia levied 30.9% of import tariff 
in 2012, 28.1% in 2013, 25.3% in 2014, 22.5% in 2015, 19.7% in 2016, 16.9% in 2017, and 
14.1% in 2018.  
Appendix B. The Rules of Japan’s RTAs 
 The followings are the brief explanations of rules in Japan’s RTAs.167 
1. General Provisions 
 The Chapter of General Provisions sets the general rules of the agreement such 
as the objectives, definitions of terms, administrative procedures, treatment of 
confidential information, exceptions, and joint committee.  
2. Trade in Goods 
 The chapter of Trade in Goods stipulates the rules of trade in goods such as the 
national treatment, elimination of customs duties, export subsidies, and safeguard 
measures. The way of eliminating tariff is determined by the tariff elimination period, 
the tariff rate, and the tariff elimination formula. These elements are stipulated in the 
tariff schedule as an annex.  
                                                   
167 METI, supra note 38. 
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3. Rules of Origin 
 The chapter of Rule of Origins specifies the rules of nationality of internationally 
traded goods. They can be generally classified into preferential sectors and 
non-preferential sectors. Rules of origin are comprised of (i) rules of origin and (ii) origin 
certification procedures.  
4. Customs Procedures 
 The chapter of Customs Procedures have rules about customs procedures such 
as the transparency, the information exchange, and the sub-committee. 
5. Investment 
 The champed of Investment stipulates the rules of investment such as the 
national treatment, most-favored nation, fair and equitable treatment, prohibition of 
performance requirements, expropriation and compensation, and investor-state dispute 
settlement.   
6. Trade in Services 
 The chapter of the Trade in Services stipulates the rules of trade in services such 
as the national treatment, most-favored nation, and market access.   
7. Movement of Natural Persons 
 The chapter of the movement of natural persons has the rules of movement of 
natural persons between parties. Japan has made horizontal commitments only in three 
areas: intra-corporate transferees, professional services and temporary stays. The 
commitment on movement of natural persons is restricted to as intra-corporate 
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transferees and professional engineers. Unskilled workers are not covered by 
commitments due to labor market concerns of every country including Japan. It is 
extremely unlikely that an EPA/FTA would include a provision that would lead to a large 
number of unskilled workers coming into the country. 
8. Energy and Mineral Resources 
 The chapter of Energy and Mineral Resources has rules to make stable trade of 
energy and natural resources such as the notification and consultation when adopting 
export restricting measures. Japan has this chapter only in EPAs with Brunei, Indonesia, 
and Australia. 
9. Intellectual Property 
 The chapter of Intellectual Property has rules about protection of intellectual 
property such as the simplifying procedures and enhancing the transparency of 
procedures, strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights, and 
strengthening enforcement.  
10. Government Procurement 
 The chapter of Government Procurement sets the rules of government 
procurement such as the national treatment, non-discrimination, fair and equitable 
procurement procedures, complaint filing systems, delisting of privatized entities, and 
offsets.  
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11. Competition 
 The chapter of Competition has rules of competition such restricting 
anti-competitive practices; and establishing common understanding and cooperative 
framework between Parties.  
12 Improvement of Business Environment  
 The chapter on the Improvement on the Business Environment provides for 
establishing a “business environment improvement subcommittee”, which is a 
discussion mechanism between the governments. If both parties agree, the 
representatives of companies can join the committee. 
13. Cooperation 
 The chapter of Cooperation provides for the framework of technical assistance 
from Japan to developing countries in many fields.  
14. Dispute Settlement 
 The chapter of Dispute Settlement sets procedures for dispute settlement 
between Parties such as the consultations, establishment of arbitral tribunals, and 
implementation of award.  
15. Electronic Commerce  
 The chapter of Electronic Commerce has rules of electronic commerce such as 
the definition of electronic commerce, the classification of digital contents, and no 
imposing customs duties.  
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16. TBT and SPS 
 Some Japanese RTAs have rules of TBT and SPS to decrease trade barriers 
relating to measures of standards and conformity assessment systems. 
17. Final Provisions 
 The chapter of Final Provisions sets the rules of amendment, the entry into 
force and the termination of the agreement.  
18. Labor and Environment 
 Japan has not had independent chapter of Labor or Environment in its RTAs 
except TPP agreement. This chapter provides for the obligation to make an effort not to 
decrease the protection level of labor or environment to increase trade and investment.  
The Procedure of a Dispute settlement 
In the WTO and Japan’s RTAs, a formal dispute settlement procedure starts by 
requesting a consultation. In the WTO, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Understanding 
on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (WTO DSU) provides for 
the procedure of a dispute settlement.168 For example, when Japan requests a 
consultation to a disputing country, the country must start a consultation within 30 days 
in the WTO DSM.169 If the consultation fails to settle a dispute within 60 days, Japan can 
request the establishment of a panel.170 A panel is established unless Dispute 
                                                   
168 WTO, DSU. Available: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm.  
169 WTO DSU, art. 4 (3).  
170 WTO DSU art. 4(7). 
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Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB) decides by consensus not to establish a panel.171 The 
panel is composed of three panelists and the Secretariat of the WTO proposes 
nominations for the panel.172 In the WTO DSM, any member having a substantial 
interest in a matter of panel, can make written submissions to the panel as a third party. 
The submission is reflected in the panel report.173 When the parties to the panel have 
failed to develop a mutually satisfactory solution, the panel submits a report to the DSB. 
The report includes the findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the 
basic rationale behind its findings.174 The period of the panel is within 6 months.175 
Within 60 days after the circulation of a panel report to the Members, the report is 
adopted at a DSB meeting unless a disputing party notifies the DSB to appeal or the DSB 
decides by consensus not to adopt the report.176 When Japan appeals a panel report, 
the Appellate Body hear the appeal. The Appellate Body is composed of 7 persons.177 
The proceeding of the Appellate Body is within 60 days.178 An appeal is limited to issues 
of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.179 
An appellate Body report is adopted by the DSB unless the DSB decides by consensus 
not to adopt the Appellate Body report. When a panel or the Appellate Body concludes 
that a measure is inconsistent with a rules of the WTO, it recommends that the Member 
                                                   
171 WTO DSU, art. 6(1). 
172 WTO DSU, art. 8(5) and (6). 
173 WTO DSU, art. 10 (2) 
174 WTO DSU, art. 12(7). 
175 WTO DS art. 12(8). 
176 WTO DSU art. 16(4)  
177 WTO DSU art. 17(1) 
178 WTO DSU art. 17(5). 
179 WTO DSU art. 17(6).  
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bring the measure into conformity with the rules.180 Compensation and the suspension 
of concession or other obligations are available as temporary measures if the 
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of 
time.181 
 For another example, in the case of the JIEPA DSM, when Japan requests a 
consultation to Indonesia, Indonesia must start the consultation within 60 days.182 
Japan can request the establishment of an arbitral tribunal to Indonesia if Indonesia 
does not start the consultation within 60 days after the receipt of the request or if the 
Parties fail to resolve the dispute through the consultations within 90 days.183 The 
arbitral tribunal comprises three arbitrators.184 Each Party, within 45 days after the 
receipt of the request for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, appoints one 
arbitrator and proposes candidates to serve as the third arbitrator who is the chair of 
the arbitral tribunal.185 The Parties agree on and appoint the third arbitrator within 60 
days after the receipt of the request for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal.186 The 
arbitral tribunal, within 90 days after the date of its establishment, submits to the 
Parties its draft award including both the descriptive part, and its findings and 
conclusions. A Party may submit comments in writing to the arbitral tribunal on the draft 
                                                   
180 WTO DSU art. 19(1).  
181 WTO DSU art. 22(1). 
182 JIEPA art. 141(2).  
183 JIEPA art. 142(1). 
184 JIEPA art. 142(3).  
185 JIEPA art. 142(4). 
186 JIEPA art 142(5).  
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award within 15 days after the date of submission of the draft award.187 The arbitral 
tribunal issues its award, within 30 days after the date of submission of the draft 
award.188 The award of the arbitral tribunal is final and binding on the Parties.189 
Compensation and the suspension of concession or other obligations are available when 
the award is not implemented and the arbitral tribunal confirms it.190  
 
 
                                                   
187 JIEPA art. 144(7). 
188 JIEPA art. 144(8). 
189 JIEPA art. 144(10). 
190 JIEPA art. 146. 
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